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1 Introduction
The idea of introducing VAT in United States may not be the most widely discussed one in
the news nowadays, but when it comes to a discussion - this frequently turns into stirring
debate. As it happens, United States is in the only OECD member that has not yet
adopted Value Added Tax on federal level. How has this industrialised nation managed
without this from of taxation while since its introduction in late 1950s nearly 160 other
countries have already implemented it? This in itself intriguing issue is however further
amplied by current economic situation of the US and scal obligations of the near future.
With shrinking tax base followed by tax cuts, higher unemployment, decit and post-war
`baby boomer' generation entering retirement age eligible for Medicare and Medicaid Value
Added Tax is conceived by many as the only solution to handle such scal conundrum.
Yet at the same time the very introduction of VAT in the US is considered to be unlikely.
Partly because commitment to progressive taxation in the US is of great importance,
so it is claimed at least. Commitment to fair taxation and contribution according to
individual capabilities is culturally engraved in history of United States. Another, equally
important principle laying at the foundation of US doctrine is this encapsulated by George
Washington:
We should avoid ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burdens that we
ourselves ought to bear.
This juxtaposition of ideas, its causes and consequences is the leitmotif of this thesis.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to scal policy. This chapter, apart from laying theoretical ground-
work on how scal policy works, also emphasises political nature of scal policy. Chapter
3 looks at consumption taxes. Focusing naturally on VATs various aspects of this kind of
tax are considered, `money machine' argument being one them. Chapter 4 addresses the
issue in the title of this thesis - value added tax in Unites States. Looking especially at
Canadian experience with VAT this chapter seeks to describe what should be taken into
account when designing US version of VAT.
1
2 Fiscal policy
This chapter considers scal policy and its important implications for the remainder of this
thesis. Fiscal policy is essentially a straightforward matter. It is about, as comptroller
general of United States and head of the Government Accountability Oce David M.
Walker dened it, `how government collects money - mainly through taxes and spends it
in government operations, programs and benets' (Walker, 2009, p. 5). This is however
as far as simplicity goes and onerous part begins.
Fiscal policy at its core is composed of two potentially contradictory elements: taxation
and government spending. Whereas the latter is unceasingly anticipated by the public,
the former frequently faces resistance. Yet for governments taxes represent a lifeblood
of a modern state - a famous statesman Cicero is believed to have said that `revenues
were the sinews of the republic' (Eccleston, 2007). So it is today that policymakers
manage nations' nances, an act requiring balance between taxing and spending. As one
would expect, nothing makes a policymaker more popular than promising new benets -
giving people money is easy, taking it away is dicult (Walker, 2009, p. 47). Schumpeter
described raising taxes as `inherently coercive', yet buttressing nation's viability. Similarly
Wood (2009, p. 7) sees history of raising taxes as `also history of the development of the
democracy'. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis' XIV nance minister famously stated that
the art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest
amount of feathers with the least amount of hissing (Eccleston, 2007)
This signalises already that it is careful not to view scal policy solely from one perspective
as it is a resultant of intertwined economical and political considerations.
Over the years many dierent schools of thought inuenced and shaped scal or better
said, macroeconomic policies of given time, from Classical to Keynesian to New Classical
and New Keynesian (Wood, 2009). Exploring in detail how each and particular policy
has evolved in surrounding historical context, however interesting, would reach beyond
the scope of this thesis.1 Hence we will focus on more current developments in scal (and
inevitably and to a certain degree) monetary policy in United States.
1Interested reader may refer to A History of Macroeconomic Policy in the United States by Wood (2009)
for comprehensive information on `interests, ideas, and practices of scal and monetary policies'.
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2.1 Fiscal policy and New Consensus
This section discusses in further part the New Consensus in macroeconomics, in which the
role of scal policy as a stabilisation device has receded and given its way to monetary
policy. Why has it happened that scal policy fell out of use? What were the main
arguments held against it? These questions as well as those concerning the actual role of
scal policy within the New Consensus are analysed.
It has been mentioned before that dierent macroeconomic principles were in spotlight
at certain points in time. Exact borderlines between when one policy had been preferred
to the other have not been agreed upon, but that is not the case here. Period of time
stretching on one end from Keynes' 1936 publication of The General Theory (or at the
latest Paul Samuelson's textbook `Economics' published in 1948, which gave central role to
Keynesian macroeconomics (Krugman, 2005)) to success of monetarism in 1970s and 1980s
on the other end is sometimes regarded as hegemony of scal policy over monetary policy
(Fontana, 2009). Keynesian policy advocated demand management and full employment.
Governments facing a recession could boost the economy or slow it down to get away from
ination by respectively choosing the level of aggregate government expenditure and taxes,
hence stabilising the demand. It does not mean that monetary policy had been excluded
from portfolio of economic instruments - it was used i.e. for credit controls (Allsopp and
Vines, 2005, p. 485). In the New Consensus scal policy has taken a step back and been
assigned with matters of sustainability and inter-temporal equity (Wren-Lewis, 2000).
Monetary policy has been accredited with short-run stabilisation in form of price stability
in the medium run and as much stabilisation as possible (Allsopp and Vines, 2005). The
New Consensus has achieved great amount of popularity. Fontana (2009, p. 28) reports
that the IS-LM model, standard tool for analysing eectiveness of both monetary and scal
policy, is `slowly but increasingly' being replaced by the New Consensus in undergraduate
macroeconomic textbooks.
In the following we take a closer look at scal policy and its instruments. We acquire the
taxonomy of arguments held against the use of scal policy proposed by Blinder (2004)
and discuss major points henceforth. In addition we take the role of scal policy within the
New Consensus under closer scrutiny. Needless to say is that at certain stage consideration
of historic circumstances and developments may shed some light on the complexity of the
matter.
We briey describe how scal and monetary policies work as found in Allsopp and Vines
(2005). `Traditional' approach to scal policy stresses the eects of government spending
and taxation on aggregate demand and consequently on output and ination. Equation
2.1 represents government's budget constraint. The actual instruments of scal policy are
(T ) aggregate taxes and (G) government spending. (D) represents decit, (iB) stands for
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nominal interest payment on outstanding debt (B).2
D = G  T   iB (2.1)
Budget decits add up directly to government's debt, that in turn is discussed in percentage
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and BY = b debt to nominal GDP ratio. Equation 2.2
thus includes primary decit in relation to GDP x = G TY , 4b represents the rate of
change in debt to GDP ratio, n is the real rate of growth,  is the ination and i is the
nominal interest rate. Real interest rate r is equal to r = i  
4b = b(i     n) + G  T
Y
= b(r   n) + x (2.2)
In further instance Allsopp and Vines (2005) dene primary decit consistent with no
change in b, xn =  b(r n) that takes into account primary surplus. In this way x xn =
4b. Next equation (2.3) represents the relation between aggregate demand, scal policy
and real interest rate. In this form aggregate demand y is set equal to:
y =   r   1x+ 2b+ z + vy (2.3)
where 2b denotes wealth eects accruing from government bonds, z represents other
permanent demand inuences and vy stands for temporary demand shock. Primary decit,
x is used to catch the eects of scal policy. Not without caution, Allsopp and Vines (2005)
note that this kind of indicator requires some unrealistic assumptions (i.e. change in taxes
leading to same eects as change in government spending), but is done so for expository
convenience.
Allsopp and Vines (2005) use three-equation approach to depict targeting ination using
interest rates. With help of exogenous level of capacity output y and aggregate demand y
from the equation 2.3 output gap can be calculated (y y) and rate of ination determined.
This in turn can be done using modied Phillips curve which charts the change in ination
rate against the unemployment rate.
4 = (y   y) + v (2.4)
In case the rate of ination diverges from the target, it can be brought back to desired
value using interest rate reaction function:
r = rn + (   T ) (2.5)
where rn is the neutral rate of interest. The three equations 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 represent a
system in which policymakers can follow target ination rate while keeping output and
2Government decit can be nanced either via government bonds or high powered money, one could
rewrite equation 2.1 as: D = G   T   iB = 4B +4H, but for reasons of simplicity and relatively
narrow application Allsopp and Vines (2005) ignore this term.
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growth rate at their potential levels, as managed by interest rate reaction function. At
this point it is important to make the observation that in order to tackle ination either
scal policy or short term interest rate can be used, or both. That means that there is,
at least in theory, perfect substitutability between these instruments, with interest rate
being the preferred option in New Consensus.
One of the opening question to this chapter asks why has the scal policy fallen out
of use. As the next section describes theoretical and practical arguments against the
use of scal policy here some of the historical circumstances surrounding the move to
monetarism shall be briey described. Fontana (2009), after Blinder (2004), looks back to
the time of president Lyndon Johnson (1963-69). This was the time of signicant rise in
public spending due to Vietnam War with economy at almost full employment. President
Lyndon Johnson put o the decision to either raise taxes or reduce spending until 1968
(or strictly speaking 1967, with Congress needing further 18 months for approval), when
taxes were raised. This rise in taxation did not aect consumer spending and consequently
did not bring the rate of ination to a halt.
With this preliminary framework in mind we shift our focus in the next section (2.2) to
main points of critique of scal policy and what has led to interest rate being the preferred
alternative to scal instruments. Section 2.3 takes a look at the role of scal policy in the
New Consensus.
2.2 The case against scal policy
In this section we investigate main arguments that have been pointed out as downside
of scal policy. To give our analysis structure, we follow an approach from Blinder
(2004), where two main categories of arguments against scal policy are outlined: prac-
tical/political and theoretical/economic arguments.
Arguments in the practical/political group question the actual use of scal policy,
whereas the theoretical/economic group challenges rather the eectiveness of it. This
division serves just the expository purpose here as in reality points from both of the
groups are very much intertwined with each other.
One frequently mentioned argument is that scal policy takes long time to work, shortly
subsumed under `lags'. Lags are outcome of the time that passes from when scal action
is needed and when its results are visible. Krugman (2005, p. 517) describes this no-
tion in a following way: '. . . scal policy is clumsy and takes so long to implement that
expansionary measures end up feeding a boom rather than ghting a recession`. This
characteristic of scal policy stems from its very core, its two instruments: government
spending and taxation. Both of these are subject to legislature changes, which in turn
take time till e.g. appropriate bill is passed (and that can be the case even when `modicum
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of bipartisanship and good will is provided' (Blinder, 2004)). Monetary policy scores here
as more exible where interest rates can be altered frequently and easily. Furthermore,
changing interest rate is less costly than changing scal policy (Allsopp and Vines, 2005).
By the same token it has been observed that delegating monetary policy to independent
central banks does not pose as much diculties as doing so with scal policy would lead
to. Delegating monetary policy to independent central banks does not only depoliticise
the whole process, but is also a matter of capacity constraints. Solow (2005) points out
that legislature is behind central banks with regards to professional sta and ability not
only to more accurately forecast economic activity, but also to amend mistakes if needed.
How much government should spend and how should it tax its citizens diers signicantly
along political spectrum. Ronald Reagan's often repeated phrase claimed that `Democrats
like nothing better than to tax and spend' (Shaviro, 2007, p. 5). Akitoby and Stratmann
(2008) examine if nancial markets are aected by interaction of scal variables and polit-
ical institutions. Results of their study show that there is evidence that nancial markets
favour right wing regimes (that usually connote smaller government and scal conservat-
ism) and disadvantage left wing governments for their current spending driven expansion
(larger government and broad social programmes).3
Fiscal policy is inherently political and therefore embodies the risk of political parities not
doing the right thing for the sake of economy but what their doctrine tells them. Solow
(2005) described this issue with focus on United States in quote below:
Deep down, the problem is to keep low politics out of discretionary scal policy.
This problem is more acute for an American than for a European, because our
Congress has no party discipline. Whenever the tax system or the budget is
opened up for change, the lobbyists and special interests descend like locusts.
It is something worth remembering and keeping in mind as the later discussion about
Value Added Tax in United States bears similar connotation. Not to forget that cutting
taxes is more likely to be popular than raising them (e.g. in case of a recession or boom
respectively). Policymakers having scal policy at their discretionary disposal may con-
tribute to an increase in government debt, and hence to lessening long term sustainability
(Wren-Lewis, 2000). Whether a country becomes susceptible due to its external debt de-
pends for sure which country it is. Walker (2009) brings back a story from 1956 when
US had control over `the bulk of Britain's foreign debt' and could successfully exercise
inuence over the British and French. By threatening UK to sell o substantial amount
of British pounds held (which undeniably would lead to depreciation it), president Eis-
enhower demanded the French and British to withdrawal from contending for control of
Suez Canal with Egypt (Walker, 2009, p. 37). Is current (federal) US decit, which is
likely to stay above 10% of GDP in 2010 (OECD, 2010b), making it susceptible? That
most probably remains to be seen. It should be stressed yet again that decision whether to
3It has to be mentioned that according to the results nancial markets also give premium to left wing
governments when their revenue increases.
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sponsor government programme by taxation or debt is driven by political interest. Munger
(2004, p. 246) notes that even if the Barrovian principle of economic equivalence is taken
as valid, taxes and debt remain `radically dierent' and of these two the latter is usually
preferred.
The Barrovian logic of economic equivalence is explained in the next section devoted to
theoretical/economic arguments against scal policy.
Arguments belonging to the theoretical/economic group, of which the Ricardian equi-
valence is mostly discussed, put the eectiveness of scal policy in question. Arestis and
Sawyer (2006) note that Ricardian equivalence is one of three arguments generally related
to as `crowding out'. First form of crowding out has a rise in interest rates as a result of
scal expansion. Higher budget decits may give rise to interest rates and private saving.
According to the second form of crowding out there is so called supply-side equilibrium
(natural rate of unemployment or NAIRU - non-accelerating ination rate of unemploy-
ment) that acts as main driver to the level of economic activity and which is, according
to this theory, not responding to the level of aggregate demand. The remainder of this
section concentrates on Ricardian proposition.
Ricardian equivalence has been named after English economist David Ricardo, who as a
matter of fact, did not believe in it himself (Blinder, 2004). This proposition was popular-
ised by Robert Barro in 1974 in his paper Are Governments Bonds Net Wealth? According
to adherents of this proposition, scal policy is not capable of inuencing aggregate de-
mand (and as a result the level of income and employment) and therefore ineective.
The total demand level in the economy stays the same disregarding whether government
nances spending with increase in taxes or debt. Increase in taxes poses a tax burden
at the time of this increase. When it comes to debt, the tax burden is twofold - while
the borrowing is outstanding, government has to have enough to pay the interest and in
the end enough to repay the loan (Allsopp and Vines, 2005). Ricardian households, in
case of tax-nanced government spending, counterbalance higher tax rate by saving more
now. They are also saving more now in anticipation of higher tax rates in the future as
government has to repay the its loans. As a result increased government spending is met
with decreased consumption in the private sector and so the total level of demand in the
economy stays the same.
Ricardian equivalence has been much debated, analysed, both theoretically and to a cer-
tain degree in empirical studies. Similarly to scal policy, Ricardian equivalence faces
some strong theoretical objections. These regard the underlying assumptions and condi-
tions in which complete osetting behaviour in private saving as a response to change in
taxes is observed (OECD, 2004). What follows is a short explanation of Ricardian equi-
valence and evaluation of objecting arguments thereof, drawing on Blinder (2004) and a
brief description of an empirical approach conducted by OECD on that very matter.
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Ricardian household's spending decision are based only on present value of it lifetime
resources. In equation 2.6 At stands for current net worth, yt+i represents future net
earnings, i is the discount factor for cash ows at t+ i.
Wt = At +
X
i
iyt+i (2.6)
A bond-nanced cut in taxes of the size 4y lifts current receipts to yt+4y. Remembering
that taxes have to rise some time in the future in order to repay the loan, the present
value of this rise in taxes is equal to 4y, leaving Wt in the end unchanged. First of what
is often regarded as `unrealistic' assumption of Ricardian equivalence involves positive
transfers to future generation based on altruism. Consumers of today think about their
devisees and balance bequests accordingly. Blinder (2004) considers this intergenerational
aspect as mostly irrelevant, as majority of issued bonds have maturity of ten years. Within
this time many of the today's taxpayers would still be alive. Next objection touches on
liquidity constraints, or actually lack of such. In case where current household budget is
constrained so that current income is more important than future inows of it, debt n-
anced tax cuts would lead to rise in spending. Wren-Lewis (2000) reports that allowing for
credit-constrained consumers denitely increases the impact of tax changes, with change
in indirect taxes having more eect on demand stabilisation than changes in income taxes.
Another argument regards planning horizon and respective interest rates for discounting
future ows of income. Households may not use as long, far sighted time range for plan-
ning current consumption as `Economic Man' probably would. Using higher interest rates
for discounting future inows means that households would value current rise in income
(due to tax cuts) more than fall in future income. If the interest used for discounting
future income is higher than government bond rate, rise in consumption may be observed
as present value of purchasing power gained is greater than this of purchasing power lost
(Blinder, 2004, p. 19). Furthermore underlying assumptions include existence of perfect
credit markets, certainty about future level of taxes and income and non distortionary
taxes. Blinder (2004) lists one more condition, the so called present value government
budget constraint. This constraint requires today's decit to be repaid as there is a upper
bound for how high and how long decit can go on. It is this condition where the tem-
porality of income tax changes stems from. Taking current level of US debt into account
this constraint remains a `theoretical nicety'.
Kirsanova et al. (2009) call Ricardian equivalence a `purely and hardly denitive macroe-
conomic theory, as it only considers income eects of tax changes while not taking other
aspects of scal policy and their eects into account'. Interestingly enough Solow (2005)
reports that United States with its massive budget decits and personal saving rates close
to zero is not very supportive environment for Ricardian equivalence. Even when the
aforementioned conditions for debt neutrality are hard to nd in reality, partial osetting
may still take place.
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In 2004 OECD included in its Economic Outlook series an approach to roughly calcu-
lating the direct eects of budget decits in saving. This section briey describes this
approach.
Using panel data analysis OECD decided to test the existence and extent of how private
saving counteracts changes in public saving. Data used included sixteen countries for years
1970 to 2002. In reduced-form error correction procedure private saving is regressed on
public saving. Equation 2.7 represents saving equation with Sprivit as private and
Sprivit = 0 + 1S
pub
it + 2Xit + eit (2.7)
4Sprivit = 0 + 14Sprivi;t 1 + 2ei;t 1 + 34Spubit + 44Xit + vit ; 2 < 0 (2.8)
Spubit public saving ratio in country i at time t, e and v represent disturbance terms, Xit
stands for vector of control variables and 4 is rst dierence operator. By solving 2.7 for
ei;t 1 and replacing this term in 2.8 both equations can be estimated together:
4Sprivit = (0   20) + 14Sprivi;t 1 + 2Sprivi;t 1 + 3Ssubit   21Spubi;t 1
+44Xit   22Xi;t 1 + vit
(2.9)
which enables putting variables of the estimating equation in rst dierences and lagged
levels. Table .1 is included in the Appendix and contains main ndings. Using this
approach OECD was able to show that direct osetting movements in private savings can
take signicant value. The direct short term private oset, according to this study, is
estimated at one half and rising to 70% in the long run. What would be of greater interest
for this thesis is question about possible country specic dierences in osetting behaviour.
In order to test this the counter cyclically adjusted budget balance, as a measure of public
saving, was checked with a dummy variable, `1' and `0' for given country and all other
countries respectively. For United States the private saving response has been found to
be positive, which can be seen in Table 2.1. Authors of the study advice caution however,
as it is hard to indicate why the response in the US is positive and oer two possible
explanations. One way to interpret this value is to say that there is a strong condence
that the decit does not directly lead to higher taxes or there might be an unknown link
between positive wealth eects and the decit. With regards to the former one could risk
a theory that no presidential candidate in the US includes higher taxes in his manifesto, as
doing so would lessen his chances of actually becoming a president. Breaking a presidential
promise is bound to face reprimand from the public.
Having taken a look at both theoretical and practical argument(s) against the use of scal
policy we continue in the next section with the discussion on the role of scal policy within
the new consensus and conclude this chapter on scal policy.
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Dependent Variable: Private Saving (in per cent of GDP, National Accounts denition):a
Private
saving
Net lending
Net lending times
country dummy
Lagged
level
Lagged rst
dierence
Lagged
level
Lagged level
Canada  0:27  0:51  0:21 0.10
France  0:27  0:51  0:19 0.07
Germany  0:27  0:51  0:19 0.00
Italy  0:27  0:51  0:19 0.04
Japan  0:27  0:51  0:19 -0.03
United Kingdom  0:27  0:51  0:18 -0.17
United States  0:29  0:51  0:22 0:44
a All models are estimated using the Arellano-Bond dierence-GMM estimator and include a common
intercept and the full set of controls (not reported). () denotes statistical signicance at the 1 per cent
level. The null hypothesis of the Sargan tests for over identifying restrictions is never rejected at classical
levels of signicance. There is no evidence of second-order serial correlation in all models.
Table 2.1: Response of private saving to scal stance: selected countries (OECD, 2004, p.
152)
2.3 Fiscal Policy within the New Consensus
In section 2.1 scal and monetary framework was outlined. We use it in this part to elab-
orate on the actual role of scal policy in the current system, where monetary instruments
are preferred. In order to do this two more equations need to be considered in addition
to 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. First is the debt accumulation relationship (equation 2.2) allowing
for debt to accrue over time. Completing these four equations is so called scal policy
reaction function, which primarily makes sure that budget debt is not allowed to increase
indenitely. Allsopp and Vines (2005) formulate therefore a negative feedback from the
debt ratio to scal instruments with bT as target debt ratio and
x  xnT =  f(b  bT ) (2.10)
and xnT standing for primary decit at the target debt ratio. When put this way, scal
policy responds to what is expected of it - providing sustainability. The term sustainable
itself can be interpreted in myriad of ways. What sustainability means in practice depends
on the scal authorities setting the actual policy, how they construe debt targets and
possible economy outcomes of such. Soon after the elections in May 2010 the newly chosen
coalition government in United Kingdom announced `emergency budget' projecting cuts in
public spending and higher taxes. Labour (opposition) condemned this budget proposal.
In Labour's view this budget is driven mostly by Tory doctrine rather than by nation's
interests. Nevertheless within the New Consensus monetary authorities take account of
actions scal authorities' actions. Allsopp and Vines (2005) see here clear distinction of
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Figure 2.1: Interest rate on 3-month US Treasury Bills since 1920 (Krugman, 2005)
roles between scal and monetary policies, the former being responsible for general level of
interest rates and the latter for the course of ination and the output gap. This division of
responsibilities does not praise one policy over the other, but rather points out in direction
of needed coordination between those two. So, what might be seen as a turning point,
one could say that scal policy macro economically indeed does matter, even within the
New Consensus - it just has clear competences. Firstly it has an eect on interest rates.
Reducing debt leads to lower debt ratio b, which may lead to wealth eects in 2.3. This in
turn causes negative pressure on output debt and monetary authorities, which look over
the output gap, in order to keep the demand have to adjust the neutral rate of interest rn
downwards.
As a second major area where scal policy is given more condence to monetary policy is in
response to large shocks - circumstances with which monetary policy would nd it hard to
deal on its own. Such circumstances would include extremely long or deep (or combination
of both) recession, nominal interest rates approaching zero and when signicant weakness
in aggregate demand becomes quickly apparent (Blinder, 2004, p. 39). Especially when
nominal interest rates are close to zero, Krugman (2005) sees scal policy coming to play
main role, as `central bank loses most of its control over monetary aggregates' and neither
output gap nor ination can be inuenced via monetary policy reaction function. The
danger looming in such a situation is a downward slump as interest rates are not likely
to create any upsurge in demand. Fiscal instruments have to be used not only in a right
way, but also in a timely manner as the case of Japan shows. It is greatly thanks to the
case of Japan why Krugman (2005) looks forward to scal policy coming back from its
bad repute. He goes on to say that, based on the course of 3 month US Treasury bill,
whenever the rate was lower than 2% macroeconomists preferred scal to monetary policy.
With interest rates on the three month US Treasury bill above 4% `Fed ruled and scal
side was unnecessary' (Krugman, 2005, p. 520). Figure 2.1 shows how this interest rate
has evolved from 1920 until recently.
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In this chapter certain aspects of both scal and monetary policy have been discussed.
Beginning with basic frameworks an attempt was made to critically assess scal policy.
The theory behind the use of scal policy has seen up- and downswings in popularity. At
one time it ruled, just couple of decades later to be called unnecessary and gave its way
to adherents of monetary policy. It helps to look at the two policies through the scope of
historical circumstances. Yet as important it is, in my opinion, to sometimes disentangle
them and take solely under scrutiny. From this discussion it appears to me that neither
scal nor monetary policy can fully do the job of running and managing the economy
on its own. There might be situations when one is more appropriate to the other. One
of them, which is not delegated to central banks, is prone to nd itself in the middle of
political debate and being dragged from one end of political spectrum to the other. As a
possible solution an independent body outside of the government has been proposed. It
would have two main objectives. First to advise on short term discretionary activities and
second to overlook long term sustainability (Wren-Lewis, 2000). The way that emerges to
be capable of of grasping intertwined and complex scope of economy is placed somewhere
between the two extremes, no matter whether such an independent body is established
or not. A sign of things slightly moving in that direction could be seen in the fact that
the chancellor of the exchequer of the newly elected UK government George Osborne,
has signed the economic and scal forecasting o to an independent Oce for Budget
Responsibility (OBR). The chancellor has nevertheless the nal say about scal policy
(Anonymous, 2010). Well meant and open coordination between scal and monetary
authorities is therefore broadly advised.
In the next chapter we take a look at Value Added Tax. This is relatively young form
of taxation which has spread over to many countries in relatively short period of time.
3 Consumption taxes
All governments impose taxes on citizens in order to raise funds required to nance public
spending, should it be schools, roads or social security. Governments dier however in
what kind of taxes they have chosen to levy, how are these dierent forms of taxation
implemented and thus what kind of eect on people they have (OECD, 2007a). This
chapter looks into one specic form of taxation on consumption - Value Added Tax1 (VAT).
This tax has become very popular in relatively short period of time. Many countries have
adopted VAT to see a large share of their spending nanced by this tax. It is therefore
crucial to see what lies behind the facade of this `attractive' tax, which was called by
one senior ocial of International Monetary Found as Mata Hari of the tax world - many
are tempted, many succumb, some tremble on the brink, while others leave only to return,
eventually the attraction appears irresistible (Schenk and Oldman, 2007).
Earliest forms of taxation were levied mostly on land and agricultural produce thereof,
as it was both visible and collectible representation of wealth. With growth of trade taxes
on imports and exports were also introduced. At the time when rms organised into com-
panies and enterprises a tax on business turnover became popular. Every time a good was
processed along the supply chain from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer a cascading
turnover tax was imposed, which in turn could not be claimed back from the purchaser.
This cascading characteristic of business turnover tax posed a strong incentive for com-
panies to integrate vertically and take advantage of tighter organisational structure. What
followed was an improved or `rened' version of turnover tax, which was based on value
added concept. According to this concept tax on sales would be reduced by amount of
tax paid for business inputs (Schenk and Oldman, 2007, p. 4). This concept evolved in
further instance to multistage VAT. A single stage tax on consumption was rather seen as
a phase preceding the move to VAT, with notable exception of United States. Ironically
enough, United States where VATs had their origins in the early 1920s (Eccleston, 2007,
p. 42), remains to this date as the only OECD country without federal value added tax.2
One way to look at dierent kinds of taxes is to distinguish between direct and indir-
ect taxes. The former is levied directly on income base and wealth whereas the latter
is imposed on expenditures nanced by this wealth (OECD, 2008a).3 This distinction
1VAT is also known as Goods and Services Tax (GST) - here those two terms will be used interchangeably
2United States still have to consider VAT when exporting and importing to countries with VAT in
place. Some of the states have introduced VAT-like forms of taxation. Chapter 4 explores the case of
consumption tax in United States in more detail.
3According to World Trade Organisation, direct taxes are taxes on wages, prots, interests, rents, loyalties,
and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property. Indirects taxes include
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between taxes on income and on consumption is crucial for the remaining part of this
thesis, as it represents two dierent directions of how scal policy can be interpreted. At
rst glance, tax on income may seem to be deeply embedded in history and culture of some
countries, especially United States, where at least an appearance of great commitment to
progressivity of taxes is kept up to this day. With consumption tax being relatively recent
development it is noteworthy that the idea of consumption as a tax base was already
mentioned in 17th century in Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. As we have seen in previous
chapter, scal policy is a highly politicised subject which frequently is set to align with
prevailing preferences and values of given political fraction, so some caution in this debate
between consumption and income taxes is well advised.
In following part an overview of consumption taxes is provided. We will be looking at
how they have spread, what role do they play in nances of countries that have acquired
VAT/GST. This will allow us in further part to draw a short comparison between income
and consumption taxes. We keep our focus on VAT as consumption tax and look in the
nal part of the chapter into discussion of it being a `money machine'.
3.1 Value Added Tax
We begin with basic nomenclature of consumption taxes as statistically used by the
OECD.4 From general consumption taxes, to which VAT, GST and sales taxes belong,
one has to dierentiate taxes on specic goods and services i.e. excise taxes. The latter
comprise of excise duties on items like tobacco, vehicle fuels, alcohol and also taxes on
special insurance and nancial operations. Apart from obvious revenue raising function
of excise taxes it is common to refer to them as a way in which governments can inuence
certain behaviour like reducing consumption of tobacco (OECD, 2008a).
Value added tax is the most omnipresent consumption tax. It is collected at every stage
of production so it means it is levied on a broad base - all commercial processes needed
to produce a good or service. It is aimed at taxing nal consumer's expenditure. OECD
(2008a, p. 23) points at possible misinterpretation of the word `consumption', which is not
to be taken literally as use of a good or service. Instead one should think of expenditure
in order to attain consumption. This very ne distinction in terms to most taxpayers may
seem without great dierence at rst sight, is meant for determination of where to impose
tax in cross-country transactions. Business sector is eligible for refund on intermediate
transaction, so input tax on purchases is deductible from amount of tax from sales. These
are the main features of value added tax. For the topic and scope of this thesis it should
suce to say that there are two main approaches of how the tax can be collected: invoice
credit- and subtraction method.
taxes on sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes,
border taxes and all other than direct taxes and import charges (Schenk and Oldman, 2007, p. 6)
4OECD distinguishes six broad categories: taxes on income, prots and capital gains, social security
contributions, taxes on payroll and workforce, property taxes and taxes on goods and services (OECD,
2008a, p. 22)
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1965 1975 1985 1995 2006
Personal income income tax 26.2 29.8 29.7 27.1 24.8
Corporate income tax 8.8 7.6 8.0 8.0 10.7
Social security contributions 17.6 22.0 22.1 24.7 25.3
Payroll taxes 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9
Property taxes 7.9 6.3 5.2 5.5 5.7
Taxes on goods and services 38.4 32.8 33.7 32.4 31.5
of which, VAT and sales taxes 13.6 14.5 16.4 17.7 18.9
Table 3.1: Revenue shares of major taxes in the OECD area (unweighted average) (OECD,
2008a, p. 47)
It has been mentioned before that VAT has spread rapidly over last decades and been ac-
quired in many countries. This shows a trend that countries look at taxing consumption
as valuable part of their tax-portfolio. It has grown, with regards to revenue raised in
OECD countries, into one of the three most important taxes (OECD, 2008a).
For the year 2006 almost one third of tax revenues (as a percentage of aggregate taxa-
tion) came from consumption taxes, of which more than a half stems from VAT and sales
tax (OECD, 2008a). Even though this is an unweighted OECD average it does allow a
careful supposition, that consumption taxes are responsible for lion share of tax revenues.
With 29 out of 30 OECD countries having adopted VAT one has to certainly look at each
country individually as dierent rates and varying range of exemptions are used. Looking
at how revenues from consumption taxes have developed over the years in OECD coun-
tries one can notice that consumption taxes as percentage of total taxation have actually
fallen together with taxes on specic goods and services. Taxes on general consumption
however have risen as a percentage of total taxation from 13.6 in 1965 to 18.9 percent
in 2005 (OECD, 2008a). This rise is on one hand explainable by successive adoption of
VAT among OECD countries over the time. From other main categories of taxes only
corporate income tax and social security contributions have increased their share over the
same period. Share of personal income tax rose from 26.2% to 29.7% just to fall later to
24.2%. Table 3.1 and gure 3.1 represent these developments for years 1965 to 2006.
Tables .2 and .3 included in Appendix contain OECD wide comparison of taxes on general
consumption. Table .4 gives an overview on historical and current rates of VAT/GST in
OECD member countries.
When comparing VAT rates among countries it is important to remember that mem-
ber countries of the European Union have to regard EU directives (i.e. VAT Directive
2006/112/EC). Nevertheless a wide array of lower or zero rates have been granted in
many countries, covering from basic an essential products and services like food, hospital
care, to utilities (public transport) or geographic areas. Main reason behind such excep-
tions is to promote equity and minimise the regressive eect of consumption taxes on
household budget. This points builds also the core argument of opposition towards the
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Figure 3.1: Share of consumption taxes as percentage of taxation (OECD, 2008a, p. 47)
| Consumption taxes as percentage of total tax
| Taxes on specic goods and services as percentage of total tax
| Taxes on general consumption as percentage of total tax
use of value added taxes, which are discussed in section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 VAT and policy transfer
VAT has spread from just a handful of countries in the early 1960s and 1970s to over
140 countries currently raising major part of their revenues with help of this ecient tax.
And while each country having VAT in its tax policy mix has adapted it to its needs and
domestic conditions the process of introducing VAT as a policy innovation also diered
from country to country. Eccleston (2007) oers comprehensive study of how the idea of
VAT diused and reached many countries, a process known as `policy transfer'. For VAT
policy transfer conveys many aspects from political and economic forces to societal and
role of individuals and policy elites that were, or in some cases e.g. US have not (yet)
been, conducive to introduction of VAT. As a result there is no single reason that can be
solely held accountable for establishment of VAT in a given country (although some may
have contributed more than others), rather one should perceive it as many factors acting
together in particular economic circumstances of given period and opening a `window of
opportunity' and letting VAT settle within the range of scal instruments.
In this way the Neumark Report of 1963 advocating all member countries of European
Economic Community (EEC) to adapt identical VATs from January 1st 1970 was met with
approval as many countries had already had a turnover tax in use and VAT presented as
superior form of it. This report, which was not binding to the member countries, was a
result of `policy elites' acknowledging a new shift in public nance theory. In the context
of 1970s economic crises and Keynesian framework weakened this shift strived for tax
neutrality of tax systems and more market-tailored design so that `market forces, rather
than the intricacies of the tax code and the political compromises they embodied, dictated
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patterns of investment and consumption' (Eccleston, 2007, p. 52).
Process of diusion of tax reforms was further complemented by role of international
agencies, in particular OECD and IMF. Both have been supporting introduction of VAT
and while they employ high-ranking ocials from countries' core nancial institutions
ideas propagated by these agencies have chance to resonate with policymakers not directly
linked with these agencies. It is nonetheless important to note that having OECD and
IMF in support of VAT alone did (and does) not necessarily mean its immediate adoption.
As Eccleston (2007) points out, for a politician to put VAT on agenda inevitably puts him
under risk of heavy opposition and widespread disconcertion.5 This is one of the reasons
why even open debate about VAT, not to mention its implementation, is often linked or
rather has to be linked to particular problems, political or economical, to be considered
at all. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss these questions for United States.
3.1.2 Opposition to VAT/GST
Consumption taxes raise many questions. Some of them go beyond methodical critique
and turn into some form of attack against VAT. We shall take a closer look at some of
them.
At the beginning of this chapter the distinction between income and VAT was emphasised.
One way of labelling these two taxes is as direct and indirect tax respectively. There is
(at least) one more way to put a tag on these two: progressive and regressive. Regressive
meaning that poorer households devote bigger share of their budget for VAT than richer
households do and thus leading to rising inequality. Income taxes are said to be more
progressive than consumption taxes. To reduce this redistributive eect of consumption
taxes governments set lower rates and exceptions on `necessities'. It is however acknow-
ledged that this strategy does not function well, as the rich can obtain more `necessities'
than the poor. It may also distort consumer choice and reduce eciency of VAT (OECD,
2007a).6 Many argue that the benet system - government's spending is a better way
of osetting this inequality (OECD, 2007a), it is not without problems as International
Monetary Fund has once described it:
Fiscal policy - taxation and spending - is a government's most direct tool
for redistributing income, in both the short and long run. However, the eect
of redistributive tax policies, especially in the face of globalisation, has been
small. Policymakers also need to consider how to distribute the burden of
taxation so the system is seen as fair and just.
5In United States this is also known is `Ullman syndrome' called after member of the Congress Al Ullman
who proposed VAT twice (in 1979 and 1989) and who as a result was defeated from Ways and Means
Committee which he was chairing, event though it was generally considered as one of the `safest seats
in Congress' (Eccleston, 2007, p. 151)
6VAT reaches highest point of eciency when applied with one single rate, that is at least the theory.
Studies have shown nonetheless that deliberate and careful choice of exception and lower rates can also
be benecial (OECD, 2008a, p. 51)
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The expenditure side of the budget oers better opportunities than the tax side
for redistributing income. The link between redistribution and social spending
- especially spending on health and education, through which governments
can inuence the formation and distribution of human capital - is particularly
strong, and public investment in the human capital of the poor can be an
ecient was to reduce income inequality over the long run.7 (IMF, 1999)
Keen (2007) points out that most of the discussions categorising VAT as regressive actually
miss the merit as they do not concentrate on distinctive features of VAT while they should
be focusing on whether the tax is intrinsically regressive.
Opponents of VAT, or introduction of it, use further arguments to make consumption
based tax seem less attractive. Apart from the regressive properties of the tax it is often
claimed that VAT is vulnerable to fraud and evasion (Keen, 2007). Estimated losses circle
around 10% of net VAT receipts for some member countries of the EU with noteworthy
cost of so called `carousel fraud' reaching 1.5% of VAT revenue in Germany. Yet tax
evasion and fraud are not specic to VAT only but for any tax (Keen, 2007, p. 377).
According to Jha (1998) RST is more prone to tax evasion than VAT. Distinctive for VAT
is the carousel fraud which aims at exploiting the zero-rating of exports and refunds being
paid to exporters. The principle used by fraudsters and organised crime is to generate
VAT refund claims that do not match with the amount of VAT really paid. With thick
net of in-between buer and often innocent companies this fraud has proven in fact to be
dicult to detect. Some possible solutions have been proposed to counteract this serious
question as its consequences reach beyond just revenue losses to distorting trade statistics
and impeding with macroeconomic management (Keen, 2007). One such solution would
include a common rate of VAT on all business-to-business deals, including transactions
between dierent member states.
According to Slemrod (2007) U.S. Internal Revenue Service has carried out studies on
non-compliance to federal tax, which happen to be the most complete studies of that
kind in the world. For the year 2001 the tax gap - amount of amount that should have
been reported, is estimated at 13.7% (or 290 billion US$). This estimate is also put in
comparison with noncompliance rates on VAT in other countries. As no unied study of
that kind has beed carried out by OECD one has to rely on countries' internal sources
of information i.e. HM Customs and Treasury evaluates this rate at 13.5% for the United
Kingdom and in other countries ranging from 4 to 17.5 percent.
Two main points of opposition however, reported at President's George Bush Tax Panel
in 2005, claim that VAT is a money machine and leads to growth of federal government,
are discussed in section 3.2. Next section briey discusses main dierences between value
added taxes and its counterparts, Retail Sales Tax and income taxes.
7i. e. Germany increased in 2007 rate of VAT partly to nance cut in social security contributions (OECD,
2007a). However Keen (2009) mentions that such `earmarking' of additional revenue from higher rate
of VAT to e.g. education may be a politically risky strategy.
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3.1.3 VAT and RST / income taxes
Some of the main dierences between consumption and income taxes have been already
discussed, i.e. the progressivity of income taxes. This section is devoted to compendiously
outline further points in which these taxes diverge from each other.
At rst we take a look at Retail Sales Tax, a tax on consumption present in some of the
states in the US. The idea behind these two taxes is the same, it is to impose a tax on
nal consumption. With VAT, as product moves along the supply chain from producer
to wholesaler to retailer, all buying parties have to pay the tax as it is later refundable
as opposed to RST which is a single stage tax. This means that in case the tax on nal
consumption was at risk - under VAT it would be only the amount on value added that
would be lost while under RST it would mean the full amount of tax lost.
Retail Sales Tax requires traders and producers to be registered and makes them respons-
ible for imposing the tax on sales to non-registered customers. Tax is not required on
sales from registered to registered parties, unless goods are intended for private use (Jha,
1998). This small dierence in how the tax operates can be viewed both as a favour or
disadvantage for either of the two taxes. Traders under VAT are required to keep detailed
information on sales and purchases as it later enables them to deduct tax paid on inputs.
Under RST such bookkeeping is not obligatory. This argument is often brought up in
debates between the two taxes to favour the latter, as it does not put that much of an
administrative burden on traders (not to mention costs induced by maintaining complete
account keeping). Jha (1998) does not see it that way and claims that administrative costs
are likely to be equal as both systems generally require traders to be registered. It may
also be seen as an additional echelon of control when both parties have to keep receipts.
For traders under RST the view is not entirely burden-free however as they have to verify
the nal user and tax him accordingly e.g. purchasing a business trip ticket under VAT is
a fairly straightforward procedure. It is up to the purchasing party to claim return on the
ticket from tax authorities. Under RST, if all the requirements were to be fullled, a RST
exemption certicate would have to be provided and the actual purpose of the trip would
need to be veried (Jha, 1998, p. 310). This means that taking account of the service
sector is signicantly less cumbersome under VAT than RST.
The choice of which tax to rely on more from the governmental point of view is crucial
for scal policy and as such has been debated for a long time. Following argument that
implementation of value added tax in United States could lead to government raising too
much money can be already found in Brennan and Buchanan (1977). How does the income
tax then compare to VAT-like tax? Bankman andWeisbach (2006) conclude that an ideally
constructed consumption tax is simply superior to an ideal income tax. Comparing ideal
forms8 of the two taxes knowing that none of them would be implemented in such a pure
8For consumption tax it means same rate is imposed on dierent forms of consumption no matter the
time of occurrence. In case of income tax that means the same nominal rate is levied on the entire tax
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form can be seen as giving income tax a head start. The two US based researchers call the
current income tax much worse than the ideal income tax and in addition, because of its
structural features, any reform of it would be dicult. Following this logic they conclude
that if by making the best possible case for the income tax consumption tax still turns out
to be superior, that the latter is even more desirable. As Bankman and Weisbach (2006)
oer very comprehensive juxtaposition of the two taxes in order to keep the scope of this
thesis we look into just few of the arguments.
To begin with Bankman and Weisbach (2006) list major arguments why would one favour
income to consumption tax. In a structured manner they prove each of these arguments
incorrect under various conditions. First of the points looks at distortions created by the
tax burden. Here the dierence lies therein that the income tax falls on the return from
savings or capital income. Consumption tax on the other side can be seen as economically
equivalent to tax on labour earnings and thus leading to a distorted view of how much
one should work. The argument for income tax states therefore that by taxing returns
from savings it is the actual tax on earning that can be kept lower. What happens to
savings under an income tax leads Bankman and Weisbach (2006) to regard it as `non-
neutral' tax on consumption as it falls heavier on future consumption than on current
one. The extent of distortion created by applying higher rates in consecutive time periods
is illustrated by following example. Having earned $100 in period t0 an individual has the
choice of spending it either immediately or in period t1. With interest rate of 5 percent
this individual could spend $105 in t1. Applying tax on returns of 40% decreases amount
available in t1 to $103, which would be similar to sales tax of roughly 2% in t1. The market
value of money in t0 under income tax equals $103 1:05 1 = 98:09. The further in time
consumption decision is deferred the higher the eective tax rate. For period of three
years the amount falls from $116 to $109 and present value to $94:15, which equals sales
tax of approximately 6 percent. For period of thirty years numbers show equivalent sales
tax rate of 80 percent as the amount for consumption drops from $432 to $240 and value
at t0 of $55. In this way tax on savings falls as heavily as direct tax on labour earnings
with the dierence that it further distorts consumption decision. By reducing the benet
of saving individuals planning future consumption are able to get less value in the future
than today.
Second argument for an income tax is the one frequently mentioned in the debates. It
states that income tax is generally progressive and better at redistribution while VAT is not
exible and cannot be adapted to individual circumstances (Schenk and Oldman, 2007).
This means that VAT-like taxes take higher proportion of lower incomes whilst income
tax rate rises with higher income. In a view of the quotation from International Monetary
Fund cited above (p. 18) it is questionable whether progressivity and redistribution should
be achieved within means of taxation as doing so by spending accordingly can yield better
results.
With the next section 3.2 we slowly turn our focus towards the core subject of this thesis
base.
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- taxing consumption in United States. The `money machine' argument, which gives title
to the proceeding section, stems from President's Advisory Panel in Federal Tax Reform,
which was created by President George W. Bush in January 2005. This advisory panel
had on its agenda recommending `options that would make the tax code simpler, fairer,
and more conducive to economic growth'. On that account next section tries to look into
what `money machine' could mean and if VAT is possibly one, based on approach found
in Keen and Lockwood (2006).
3.2 `Money machine'
Panel members recognized that lower income tax rates made possible by VAT
revenues could create a tax system that is more ecient and could reduce the
economic distortions and disincentives created by our income tax. However, the
Panel could not reach a consensus on whether to recommend a VAT option.
Some members of the Panel (. . . ) expressed concern about the compliance
and administrative burdens (. . . ). Some members were also concerned that
introducing a VAT would lead to higher total tax collections over time and
facilitate the development of a larger federal government - in other words, that
the VAT would be a money machine (President's Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform, 2005, p. 192).
Two main points of opposition emerging from this panel's quote are that VAT is partic-
ularly ecient at making money for the government and by the same token, causes the
government to expand in size. One could think that from government's point of view,
an ecient tool of raising revenue is somewhat benecial and could be in turn used for
`wider social good' (Keen, 2009). Perhaps the latter point, growth of government, espe-
cially in the United States is the one which is feared the most and is seen as an unwelcome,
looming consequence of VAT implementation. This poses an interesting question whether
there was similar hesitation in the US of allowing free markets. Reason being that free
markets can have social consequences i.e. ultimately driving the demand for government
in the long term - but this is a matter for a dierent thesis.
So what is a `money machine' and is VAT one? An approach to researching these two ques-
tions can be found in Keen and Lockwood (2006) who distinguish between two forms of
`money machine' hypotheses: a weak and a strong money machine. First one addresses the
question whether countries with VAT in place raise more revenue than countries without
it (by keeping all other thing equal).`The strong money machine hypotheses' targets the
causality claim, that the adoption of VAT actually leads to a bigger government as in terms
of total tax revenues. Ways of testing the two hypotheses dier somewhat with the weak
one being less complicated to calculate. As both hypotheses are intertwined with each
other they share nonetheless common tax design structure. For the weak money machine
equation 3.1 represents welfare function which government ultimately seeks to maximise
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with R standing for tax revenue creating welfare U and one single tax instrument. 
depicts how ecient is this tax instrument - low value of  would mean an ecient tax.
W = U(R) 

1
2

R2 (3.1)
With more ecient tax, according to the hypothesis, more revenue is collected than in
countries without this ecient tax. This condition is represented in equation 3.2.
U 0(R)  R = 0 (3.2)
In order to check whether the impact of VAT on revenues is signicant, dummy variables
and interaction terms for presence of VAT are added to tax eort equations, as the lat-
ter put tax ratios in relation to distinctive attributes of an economy i.e. its openness to
international trade, share of agricultural sector in GDP or income per capita, which are
represented in equation 3.39 by a column vector Xit of explanatory variables. By adding
dummy variable for VAT as in equation 3.3 it can have not only a direct eect on revenue
but also through other variables. Rit represents the tax revenue to GDP ratio of country
i at time t, Vit is the just mentioned (binary) dummy variable for the presence of VAT
(Vit = 1) and in case there is no VAT in country i at time t, Vit is equal to 0.
Rit = Vit + 
0
vVitXit + 
0Xit + i + t + uit (3.3)
Country and year specic eects are represented by i and t, with uit denoting random
disturbance. By running regressions of 3.3 with Rit as dependent variable it is thus
possible to check for weak machine hypothesis:  + 0VXit > 0 on panel of thirty OECD
countries for the period stretching from 1965 to 2004.10 According to this analysis VAT
has indeed proved to be a `weak money machine' in the sense that the eect on tax ratio
is signicantly positive. This eect in total revenue is however fairly moderate in size
with revenue gains (4R =  + 0V X) of VAT implementation reaching in some countries
between 0.5 and 2.1 percent of pre-VAT tax ratio.
For the `strong money machine hypothesis' we can use adapted forms of equations 3.1 and
3.2 accordingly. Equation 3.4 represents an objective function where government has two
tax instruments:
U = V (RA +RB) 

1
2

A(RA)
2  

1
2

B(RB)
2 (3.4)
A and B to choose from. RA and RB stand for level of revenues generated from those
two tax instruments and in turn used for public expenditure. V symbolises private utility
coming from public expenditure with  as a parameter depicting how strong this preference
is. i is the parameter capturing both eciency and ineciency of a given tax instrument.
9This equation is also explained in section 4.4
10Full results of regressions can be found in Table .5 in Appendix.
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R2A;B depict the idea, that with the revenue raised by A or B growing marginal costs of
raising it also increases. Equation 3.5 thus states an important rule for Ri which implies
two possible eects.
V 0(RA +RB) = iRi; i = A;B (3.5)
One that increase in  - the `taste for government' leads to an increase in revenue raised
with the two instruments RA and RB. Second implication shows what happens when
one of the instruments, VAT (or A in equations), becomes more ecient. That means
lower parameter i to start with. Furthermore, revenue raised by A as well as by the two
instruments together, RA + RB increases. Private utility, V , benets from having more
ecient tax instrument. This benet has two sources. One is increased public expenditure
and second is reduced dependance on the second less ecient of the two tax instruments
B, which in turn implies that RB drops. What can be also observed is that in certain
conditions public utility might respond more to reducing dependance on the less eective
of the instruments instruments than to mounting up total revenue.
Keen and Lockwood (2006) use two approaches for testing strong money machine hypo-
thesis. First of them employs Granger causality tests. With this approach the question
stated was whether the time series of lagged values of revenue from VAT (RVit in equation
3.7) could be used to forecast future values of total tax revenue (R in equation 3.6).
Rit = 0 + 1Ri;t 1 + 2Ri;t 2 + 1RVi;t 1 + 2RVi;t 2 + i + uit (3.6)
RVit = 0 + 1RVi;t 1 + 2RVi;t 2 + 1Ri;t 1 + 2Ri;t 2 + i + !it (3.7)
Table .6 contains results of the Granger causality tests, which however leave the question
concerning causality somewhat unsolved. The second approach takes a slightly dierent
way and asks whether, once the weak money machine hypothesis has been veried, the
increased revenue from VAT has been balanced by a fall in revenues from other taxes. This
can be thus estimated with help of equation 3.8 in which, similarly to 3.7, RVit stands for
the revenue coming from value added tax expressed as a share of GDP,
Rit = Ri;t 1 + VRVit + Vit +  0Zit + i + t + it (3.8)
; ; ; V denote estimative parameters and Z a vector of additional variables and three
error terms: i country specic, t time specic and it idiosyncratic error. The degree of
osetting of VAT revenues is thus captured by V in the short run and in the long run
dened as   V1  . In similar fashion to parameter  from 3.1 and 3.4 denoting eciency
of tax particular instruments,  takes value of unity if there is no osetting. Values of 
lower than unity would indicate marginal osetting and values of  > 1 would signalise
that revenue from both VAT and other taxes surge.
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12 2 3 4
R  1 0.812 0.816 0.836
(0.017) (0.017) (0.181)
RV 0.598 0.172 0.172 0.137
(0.078) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041)
V -2.414 -0.835 -0.795
(0.544) (0.258) (0.258)
 0.598 0.913 0.935 0.835
(0.0708) (0.191) (0.196) (0.245)
Observations 864 825 825 630
R2 0.944
Serial correlation F(1; 29) = 1; 159:77
p=0.000
1 Both in percent of GDP; robust z-statistics in parentheses;  indicates
signicance at 1 percent,  at 5 percent.
2 Country and time dummies included (the former in all regressions) but
reported
Table 3.2: Second approach to strong `money machine' - relating total revenue to VAT
revenue1 (Keen and Lockwood, 2006, p. 919)
Table 3.2 is an abridged version of table .7 containing detailed results of regressions run on
the same panel of data as `weak money machine' hypothesis and included in Appendix for
completeness. What an be observed throughout the test is that the osetting parameter
 is taking values between 0 and 1, which indicates that VAT has indeed led to increased
total revenue, but this increase has been to a large degree oset by decreasing revenues
from other taxes which is in line with the strong money machine hypothesis. Looking
at these results from OECD wide viewpoint, on average VAT makes up 6.9 percent of
total tax revenue, and the corresponding increase in total revenue due to implementation
of VAT is estimated to reach 2.4 percent in the long run. Furthermore, two thirds of
revenue coming directly from VAT is expected to be oset by falling revenues from other
tax instruments.
Concluding this chapter we can say that VAT has indeed proven to be a money machine
both in the weak and the strong sense. Yet its eciency in raising revenue tends to be
rather used by governments not for stockpiling reserves but for exchanging less ecient
tax instruments. In that sense Keen and Lockwood (2006) see money machine arguments
as reasons speaking for the implementation of VAT and not as feared in President's Tax
Panel, against it. Needless to say, political inclinations play a great role not only in the
decision of adopting VAT but also making changes to it once it is in place. All this
raises the importance of making sure that the vat like tax gets properly enacted from
the beginning, as `less than perfectly functioning VAT is an analytical mess' (Keen, 2007).
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Section 4.4 will address a further study of Keen and Lockwood (2010) who researched
the revenue gains and determinants of VAT adoption on panel of 143 countries over the
period of 26 years. Using panel data from not only OECD countries makes it possible to
look for regional dierences arising from countries' individual circumstances of adoption
and implementation of VAT. In the following chapter we look more closely at the relation
of United States to the idea of federal value added tax. A subject for which, according
to (Keen, 2007) there is `not much research' done and mostly because the country in
the centre of attention, United States, is allegedly not itself interested in VAT and thus
aecting overall research interest away from VAT. Taking such `scarcity' of literature on
board we will try to inquire into why has United States not yet adapted the VAT, would
it need such a tax instrument like VAT at all and if yes, is there comparable experience
from other countries that could be used. For the latter we inquire into experience Canada
has made with VAT, where federal General Sales Tax was introduced in 1991. Owing
to somewhat similar governmental structure and issue of scal autonomy carved deeply
into provincial mindset, Canada makes an interesting case to relate to for the possibility
United States was to adapt value added taxes.
4 VAT/GST in the United States
This penultimate chapter looks at the quintessential point in this thesis, which is about the
United States and VAT/GST-like consumption taxes. Even before we start considering
relevant questions one can say in advance that the actual possibility of implementing a
broad-base federal consumption tax in the US is incredibly low, at least for the near future
that holds true. This does not mean however that one should not consider the possibility
itself (and consequences of it) as there may be many dierent reasons for it being so low.
To start with we take a short look at current economic situation in the US, which eventually
leads to an important question: does the US actually need VAT-like tax at all? If yes,
why is the US the `nal frontier for the VAT'(Keen, 2009)?1 To put it other way we will
try to answer why is it that such an ecient form of taxation has not yet been introduced
in the country that dominates global economy while at the same time its tax system had
little if no contribution to this dominance (Eccleston, 2007, p. 139).
If the US were to adapt VAT, which some observers according to Avi-Yonah (2009) see
happening within next decade, it would be worthwhile to study the case from north of
the border. Canada shares some commonalities with regards to economical and political
structure and is a good example of consumption taxes working well on both federal and
sub-national level. With these matters discussed we shift our focus to an attempt in
modelling probability and revenue impact of VAT adoption as found in Keen and Lockwood
(2010). We conclude this chapter with general suggestions which would help ensure that
if VAT in fact was to become reality in the US, it would take account of US specic
conditions and it would would work as intended.
4.1 Does US need VAT?
Looking at current state of the economy alone will not provide sucient answer to the
question whether United States need a VAT/GST-like tax as there are many long term
scal challenges looming behind the corner. At the present economy is slowly coming
out of recession, industrial production is gaining strength and slight rise in consumption
expenditures is noticeable. The government has reacted to the housing downturn and
nancial crises with a mixture of monetary and scal measures by lowering federal funds
rate and providing tax rebates (Figure 4.1a). With increased government spending i.e.
for defence, scal stimulus packages and no commensurate rise in taxation, federal budget
decit is expected to border at ten percent mark (Figure 4.1b), which is far from 1%
1To be fair one has to point out that two states, Michigan and New Hampshire have `imperfect state-level
VATs', Single Business Tax (SBT), which is addition method VAT (Schenk and Oldman, 2007)
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decit projected by Congressional Budget Oce back in 2007.2 Out of every dollar spent
by Treasury 46 cents is borrowed (Yrjanson, 2009). The CBO further projects a rise of
federal debt held by the public from 36% in 2007 to 292% of GDP in 2050 with scal
gap estimated at 5.2% of GDP for the next 50 years. There are dierent ways how to
look at these gures i.e. those of two prominent economists Larry Kotliko and James
Galbraith. The rst one uses general accounting which subtracts projected revenues from
commitments governments has made, and because richer and established countries gen-
erally have broader social programmes it makes them look worse when compared with
countries without or less comprehensive benets. As a possible solution Kotliko advises
governments to cut spending and/or raise taxes. James Galbraith on the other side puts
forward the idea that there is no danger of insolvency for United States as it always can
impose taxes and print more money and thus considers generational accounting as mis-
guiding. The author of this thesis considers these two approaches somewhat extreme yet
to his understanding both have some rationale behind them and even share certain com-
monalities - making the use of the government's right to impose taxes, if only that was
a non problematic issue in the US. The current administration faces however signicant
challenges already in 2011 when so called `baby boomers' - post World War II generation
enters retirement age of 65 and thus is eligible for social entitlement programme Medicare.
Coincidentally longevity is increasing so by 2050 number of 65 year olds is expected to
double, while fertility rates are low (OECD, 2007b). Under current projections from CBO
costs of Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security are expected to surge from 8.4% of GDP
to 25.7% in 2082 while federal revenue for corresponding time would only increase from
18.8% of GDP to 20.9% of GDP (Viard, 2009).
Avi-Yonah (2009) sees three, at least in theory, possible solutions from this situation.
First would include signicant cuts in the three major programmes. Second would aim at
getting more revenue from the taxes already in place: income and payroll taxes. Third is
introduction of VAT. From voters' point of view none of those three is optimal as Crook
(2010) described it:
American voters want more public services than they are willing to pay for.
That is the country's scal problem in one sentence. When it comes to public
nance, the "live now, pay later" mentality that caused the economic collapse
still prevails.
Enacting benet cuts, the rst alternative, is favoured according to Viard (2009) by only
5 percent of taxpayers and could be seen as `politically unacceptable'. Under current
democratic administration medical costs, especially considering health care reform, are
expected to rise. Second option is to raise existing taxes for top earning households to
generate more revenue, which would go in line with the idea of progressive taxation -
high income earners contributing more than their less well o counterparts. Top income
2As OECD (2007b, p. 60) points out, the rules and assumptions used by the CBO for making budgetary
forecasts often produce `too rosy picture for government nances.'
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Figure 4.1: US economic situation 4.1a (OECD, 2008b, p. 30), 4.1b (OECD, 2010a, p.
195)
households in the US, ve percent of all households, earn approximately 32 percent of
national income. Because of the nature of income tax, an increase in taxation for this
group could only mulct 16 percent of national income (and not the 32 percent). Raising
revenue equal to 4 percent of national income from this very narrow base would require
changing current marginal tax rates up by 25 percentage points (Viard, 2009), which
eventually could lead to distortions and erosion of the tax base due to increased tax
avoidance and evasion (Avi-Yonah, 2009). It is not only income tax base that is shrinking
(40 percent of Americans do not pay income tax), but also this of RST as well. Retail
sales taxes in many states for most part do not apply to interstate sales which is one of
the reasons behind the boom in mail and online purchasing (Schenk and Oldman, 2007).
The idea of adapting VAT in United States is, even with a view on upcoming scal
challenges in the near future, more acknowledged among scholars and academics than with
policymakers, which in itself is not all that surprising as consumption taxes are politically
considered taboo (Montgomery, 2009). This is not stopping studies and estimates from
advocating some form of national VAT e.g. from Leonard Burman3 who calculates that
with 25% VAT United States could nance health care reform and solve the federal budget
issue.
The economic rationale speaking in favour of adopting VAT in the US is indeed convincing,
yet it does not draw a full picture why there is a need for a tax reform. Current system
is frustratingly complex, which was one of the reasons for George W. Bush calling the
Tax Reform Panel in 2005 mentioned earlier. While generally seen as a country with low
3Leonard E. Burman, A Blueprint for Tax Reform and Health Reform, Virginia Tax Review 28(2):287-323
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tax burden - 10 percentage points lower than OECD average, US subjects its tax payers
to a conundrum of state and federal provisions. Marginal direct tax rates reaching 70
percent were lowered in 1986 reform, corporate prots however still face double taxation
with marginal tax rate on capital income up to 65 percent (Eccleston, 2007, p. 141).
Yrjanson (2009) reports on management of tax compliance costs for businesses that have
to deal with sales taxes in 45 states, District of Columbia and local jurisdictions in Alaska,
resulting in 13 thousand tax authorities. This is clearly a signicant burden.4
4.2 `Final frontier'
A number of proposals regarding introduction of VAT in the US has been made, none of
them was seriously considered however. In order to answer the question stated in the title
of this chapter it is important to look back at these proposals together with their sur-
rounding economic and political circumstances. First noteworthy consideration of VAT,
according to Eccleston (2007), was made in 1969 in report submitted to Treasury by a
Commission established by President Nixon. Main idea behind this move was to provide
a relief to, at that moment dicult, scal position and furthermore, to lower business
taxes. Shortly after in the early 1970s the scal situation improved slightly and VAT was
no longer on the agenda, at least until next proposal. This happened to be the already
mentioned case of Al Ullman, a Democrat who wanted US tax system to have solid footing
and be less dependent on income tax. Opposition Al Ullman faced was from both sides
of political spectrum with prevailing notion that government decits should be addressed
with cutting expenditures and not introduction of new taxes. Arguments used back then
against VAT by the two main parties have staid the same, Republicans fear that national
consumption tax would raise too much revenue (and lead to growth of government - `money
machine' ) and Democrats' opposition is mainly based on the argument of its regressive
nature. Even if a politician is supporting VAT, raising this idea in public, because of great
unpopularity among voters and among fellow politicians, is unlikely or could be considered
a shortcut to ending one's political career - `Nobody wants to get an Al Ullman syndrome'
a Republican politician, who was personally convinced of benets connected with VAT, is
reported to have said about Ullman's loss as a Chairman of Ways and Means Committee.
With ination on the rise in the early 1980s anti government movements started focus-
ing attention on awed income tax base with many exemptions being exploited by the
wealthy. In such environment presidential promise of Ronald Reagan not to raise any new
taxes and rather give tax cuts was met with enthusiasm. In the end result of these actions
was higher decit which almost doubled by 1984 and which in turn was to be addressed
by removing exemptions and loopholes. Leading up the 1986 Tax Reform Act VAT was
given little consideration for few reasons. First, President Reagan did not want to break
his campaign promise. Secondly, VAT was considered to carry high administrational and
4Yrjanson (2009, p. 14) also gives an example of the scope of monthly changes in tax legislature - May
of 2009 brought alone 360 sales and use tax changes followed by 138 new tax authorities.
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transitional costs, and therefore was not really a serious alternative. Yet the 1986 TRA is
generally regarded as the `most signicant reform to tax base in the post-war period', as
it sheds light on what combination of factors may result in successful amendment to what
is considered touchy piece of legislation. Eccleston (2007) sees here fortunate mixture of
`political, economic and ideational' factors preceding the reform. Not only the dicult
scal stance had been acknowledged, but also system's inability to raise enough revenue
in a fair, progressive way. Together these factors opened a `window of opportunity' which
with help of policy entrepreneurs and supporting political leadership enabled change.
The temptation to promise voters benets in presidential campaigns is huge and it may
not only yield popularity with voters, but also may somewhat constrain government in
the scope of useable alternatives. `Read my lips - no new taxes' was George H. W. Bush's
in the end broken promise as new taxes (on petrol and home heating oil) had to be intro-
duced in face of rising decit and obligations from various entitlement programmes. VAT,
due to its alleged `administrative complexity' was this time dismissed not by President
Bush senior, but his budget director.
For the time of Bill Clinton's presidency at least two VAT proposals were made, and they
go on account of Republican party as President included in his campaign a commitment
not to introduce national sales tax. In the context of spending cuts and solid economic
growth Republicans voiced their opposition by winning two Houses of Congress in 1994,
but without President's support these two proposals to replace income with consumption
tax could not go through. Following eight years of Clinton's presidency positive economic
forecasts justied, what might now seem as xed ingredient of (successful) presidential
campaign, tax cuts promised by George W. Bush. With 11th of September much has
however changed, defence spending surged and business condence declined. Almost 2
percent of GDP surplus turned within four years to 4.4 percent of GDP decit in 2004.
Eccleston (2007) remarks that since 2000 US scal policy is trying to achieve contradicting
goals as it on one side is cutting taxes (thus curbing the government's size) and on the
other is launching further entitlement programmes. With all these developments in the
background the aforementioned 2005 Tax Reform Panel was called which brought sev-
eral propositions to introduce VAT. Notably the Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan was somewhat in favour of consumption taxes as he gave his testimony to the
Panel:
. . . one of the rst decisions that you will confront is the choice of tax base,
possibilities include a comprehensive income tax, a consumption tax, or some
combination of the two, as is done in many other countries. As you know,
many economists believe that a consumption tax would be best from the per-
spective of promoting economic growth - particularly if one were designing a
tax system from scratch - because a consumption tax is likely to encourage
saving and capital formation. However, getting from the current tax system
to a consumption tax raises a challenging set of transition issues (Greenspan,
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2005).
This brief summary of past VAT proposals does not discuss their details in full length,
yet it gives, in author's opinion, valuable insights in how diverse and politically dicult
it would be to accomplish such a motion. For Eccleston (2007) several reasons emerge
from the US post-war period policies as to why no national consumption tax has yet been
implemented. Whilst there have been individual supporters of national consumption tax
the idea has not managed to galvanise any consensus among policy elites, remarkably IRS
and Treasury ocials were against it. Without any prominent support the task of advoc-
ating VAT was delegated to numerous lobbying groups, which not surprisingly leads to
at least as many dierent possible variants of VAT implementation and rather inevitably
diminishes chances of reaching an agreement on the shape of VAT.
Support for VAT from high-ranking ocials, if there was any, could help gain some mo-
mentum among politicians. As both parties in the US generally oppose national con-
sumption tax they do it for dierent reasons. These reasons blend well in the historical
context of tax politics: Republicans dote on the premise to keep federal government and
its taxation capabilities small. VAT as particularly ecient tax is, in conservative circles,
a `money machine' - in direct opposition to this premise and should therefore be rejected
for being too ecient (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977). Democrats, on the other side, fear
the regressive impact of broad-base consumption tax even though revenues from it could
allow for funding various welfare programmes. Bearing that in mind it is even more sur-
prising that the policy of George W. Bush with its increasing welfare transfers and lower
taxes on income resembles many properties of consumption tax.
Another obstacle that often stands in the way of national consumption tax in the US is
the structure of legislative and executive branches. Eccleston (2007, p. 186) points out
that the
institutionally fragmented structure of decision making authority in the United
States limits the capacity of executive government to implement radical changes
to the tax code.
This notion of separating and at the same time limiting the federal government is also
visible in how the States perceive national consumption tax. Because sales taxes are in
domain of the individual States federal VAT poses a threat to their revenue base. Adding
diculty to the whole issue is the fact, that it would require a truly bipartisan approach
to introduce VAT, which is sometimes even hard to achieve on less contentious matters.
Looking at the two questions, whether United States needs VAT and why there is no
such a tax on national level there yet, may seem at rst to leave the stance open-ended in
a way that any answers still are debatable. One might say, US has made it so far without
national VAT and can equally well continue without one - in a view of upcoming scal
commitments this would denitely be a challenge. Without a slightest doubt, introducing
a federal VAT would also be challenging. Yet it is the second alternative that author of
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this thesis, as far as his reasoning is concerned, looks up to as plausible (however politically
dicult) solution yielding more potential than remaining with current tax policies. This
choice can be justied by the fact that experience from previous tax reforms shows that
consensus for a change, in conducive environment, is possible. Furthermore, the case of
Canada (discussed in the next section 4.3) where much feared combination of federal and
provincial taxes has been in fact functioning well, adds to the view that appropriately
designed national VAT is possible in the US.
4.3 Canada and GST
Canada introduced Goods and Service Tax, a form of federal VAT, on 1 January 1991 with
rate of seven per cent. GST is one of four components or kinds of consumption tax present
in the GST-HST-QST-RST system5. It is a system in which federal VAT cohabits with
VATs, RSTs and no sales taxes at all on subnational level. Quebec was rst to replace RST
for provincial VAT - called Quebec Sales Tax, on somewhat special terms, at the time when
GST was introduced. Three Atlantic provinces succeeded in 1997.6 The dierence is that
while Quebec has somewhat slightly dierent tax base and collects both QST and federal
GST, for costs of which it receives compensation from the government. In the three, or
from 1 July 2010, four `harmonizing' provinces federal government collects both provincial
and federal VAT under one name - Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). Department of Finance
is working together with Statistics Canada on aggregate revenue pool, which in next step
is allocated among provinces according to a `straightforward, but not simple' procedure
(Bird and Gendron, 2009). For each of the ten provinces tax base is calculated for ve
components.7 On this estimated base provincial rates are applied and further calibrated
to correspond with tax revenues. After deducting provincial rebates monthly entitlements
are paid to HST provinces. Canada's initiation with VAT was neither quick nor quiet,
but long and politically painful (Bird and Gendron, 2009), and now it is considered to
be working well, well enough for the biggest province, Ontario, to adapt it from 1 July
2010. According to Bird et al. (2006) Canada's experience with subnational consumption
taxes is the most valuable for United States for couple of reasons. Firstly, other countries
with two-levels sales tax i.e. Argentina or Brazil have tax base limited to some specic
sectors only. Moreover Canada introduced destination based VAT while retaining in some
provinces Retail Sales Taxes, what can be seen as a exible solution providing the provinces
with autonomy. In the remainder of this section we look at the narrative of how federal
GST was brought to life and furthermore, what kind of implications for the US could be
extracted from Canadian case.
5Table .8 oers an overview on Canadian sales tax system in individual provinces.
6New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador
7consumer expenditures, residential construction, nancial institutions, public sector bodies and other
taxable supplies not included in previous categories. Table .9 contains more detailed information.
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As with past proposals putting forward VAT in the US it is important to look at the
political and economic circumstances that altogether enabled federal VAT in Canada, as
none of these alone is conducive enough for such a change.
Federal GST took place of single stage Manufacturers Sales Tax (MST) that raised reven-
ues for federal government from 1924. MST, which was applied to most goods produced
in Canada, was criticised in great extent for its `narrow and arbitrarily' chosen tax base
and thus compromising competitiveness of Canadian-produced goods against imports (Ec-
cleston, 2007). Further criticism of MST pointed at high eective tax rates from the ap-
plication of both MST and RST leading to higher costs of capital, which in turn distorts
decision about what inputs should be obtained. Parallel to governmental attempts to
broaden the tax base to distributive sector by redening what counts as manufacturing,
business were successful in avoiding MST by simply restructuring their enterprises. In
order to maintain similar revenues, which for MST in years between 1960 and 1990 means
around 10% to 20% of Federal revenue, and in view of shrinking tax base, government
had to raise MST rate from 9 per cent in 1984 to 13.5 per cent in 1989 (Bird et al., 2006).
This raises a question why such an inecient and disruptive tax was kept in place for so
long. Eccleston (2007) sees here a situation where there is no consensus on alternative
kind of tax to replace MST and 10% to 20% Federal revenue is still a valuable addition
to the budget that no one would like to simply give let go. Furthermore he states that
`the short term political transition costs (. . . ) exceeded the political and economic benets
of reform'. And MST might have remained for longer had it not been for the Progressive
Conservative party elected in 1984 and economic situation it had to face in the late 1980s.
Canadian decit between 1970 and 1990 uctuated between 5 and 10 percent of GDP
and added substantially to the costs of servicing national debt. By the late 1980s one
in every three dollars in federal taxes was used for that very purpose. The Progressive
Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, gaining majority of seats in 1984 election,
decided to reform the tax code and introduce federal VAT as a main tool of reducing the
debt. Knowing that federal VAT is a politically dicult subject Mulroney's government
waited until it was elected for the second time in 1988 to conduct changes. Even in face
of great opposition the Prime Minister Mulroney was convinced that broad based federal
consumption tax is the right alternative, introducing it in the House of Commons Finance
Minister stated following:
Politically, the expedient thing would have been not to proceed with the GST
- the expedient thing for the Government but not for the country. (Eccleston,
2007, p. 103)
Going however into ne details of Canadian politics at that time is not at the heart of
the scope of this thesis. We shall therefore look at Canadian experience with VAT from
the perspective of United States. Following this path it is possible to draw some parallels
with regards to what would be the main obstacles of VAT in the US and that Canada had
to deal with and has done so rather successfully.
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Higher administrative burden and compliance costs of VAT is often echoed argument
brought against this from of tax. Bird et al. (2006) does not share this view and points
out that, according to studies conducted before and after the introduction, GST compli-
ance costs are lower than those of administering MST and RST. Furthermore, Canadian
government, in order to ease the transition, oered credit to small business for necessary
equipment and simplied requirements for small business i.e. less frequent ling for GST
returns.
Similarly to United States, provinces in Canada can levy their own sales taxes that con-
tribute greatly to their budget.8 A federal consumption tax may be, for that reason, taken
as a threat to provincial revenue and hence to (scal) autonomy of individual provinces.
Yet Canadian experience shows quite remarkable results. Smart and Bird (2009) discover
that in the provinces which have replaced RST for VAT, the annual level of investments in
machinery and capital is up by 12 per cent compared to provinces with RST still in place.
This is an acknowledged and disruptive eect of higher eective taxation rates under RST
on business inputs. For provincial governments, what may also be of importance, is that
marginal cost of raising a dollar in revenue through sales taxes on capital, is, as Smart
and Bird (2009) report, cheaper with VAT than with RST ($1.13 and $2.30 respectively).
It is mostly economic reasons why the Province of Ontario is joining HST, Bird and Gen-
dron (2009) summarise this decision as `more money, lower administrative outlay, better
economic outcomes' for Ontario.
Bird et al. (2006) remark that GST has not turned out to be a `money machine'. GST
was initiated with rate of 7 per cent and revenues from it followed the growth rate of nom-
inal GDP and the growth rate of nominal consumption, averaging at around 5 per cent a
year. In 2006 GST was even lowered to 6 percent. With appropriate monetary policy it
is further possible to reduce `price shock' and avoid inationary `price-wage spiral'.
Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments from Canadian experience with federal
VAT can be derived from how Canada tried to minimise the regressive impact of this kind
of tax. GST base employs both zero rating and exemptions for `necessities' i.e. groceries,
medical devices or prescription drugs. This seems to be a standard, or rather a political
prerequisite for introducing VAT in most countries. A further step in progressive direction
includes indexation of federal transfer payments to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In
this way any increase in sales taxes leads to an increase of federal and provincial trans-
fer payments. For having the most progressive eect however Bird et al. (2006) regard
refundable income tax credits introduced along with GST. Lower income households can
request full credit, which gradually subsides with increasing income.
Canadian experience with VAT, even if not fully convincing, may be seem as encour-
aging for United States. Not only has it made dierence for the federal government to
have replaced ailing MST and aid the budget but also provinces get economic advantages
8Only the province of Alberta does not have any RST, owing to it being `oil-rich'
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from having acquired VAT. Not to mention the fact that this decision has not undermined
their scal independence, provinces still have the say on nal look of the tax code. If they
decide for very `individual' approach by having dierent rates and exemptions it ulti-
mately creates higher administrative burden. If they however decide on more harmonised
approach, meaning more cooperation between individual provinces and between provinces
and the Federal government, then provinces are the sole beneciaries and not the Fed-
eral government (Bird and Gendron, 2009). Canadian system, in essence, shows that it
is possible to integrate `dual-VATs' i.e. this of Quebec, HSTs, RSTs or no RSTs at all.
Required is however certain trust between provinces and federal government, conducive
legal framework (taking into account local governments in the US) and to a certain degree
committed political leader who would not be afraid of eventual political backlash, which
is bound to arise. For Canada it was Prime Minister Brian Mulroney who led Progressive
Conservative government to introduce GST and in late 1980s was convinced that:
If we ducked the sales tax issue and avoided the tough decision on restructuring
the economy, we could be passing the buck to our children, leaving them a
legacy of hardship and debt they might never be able to overcome. (Eccleston,
2007)
This is also the opinion found in Walker (2009) regarding current situation in United
States, stressing the immense scal burden left to future generations unless US starts to
rely more on consumption taxes.
Before we delve into concrete recommendations as to in what shape and form should
US adapt VAT we shall take a look at study done by Keen and Lockwood (2010) on panel
of 143 countries regarding revenue gains and factors determining about adoption of VAT.
4.4 Determinants and revenue gains of VAT adoption
By looking for what set of factors can have a signicant inuence on the adoption of
VAT and estimating corresponding revenue gains Keen and Lockwood (2010) extend their
`money machine' study, described in section 3.2, to over one hundred countries. The aim
here is to nd out reasons behind cross country dierences in tax ratios, given that adop-
tion of VAT had a positive eect on revenue and in further instance to look for possible
explanations why countries have decided to implement VAT. Modelling of the revenue
impact (but not of the decision to adopt a VAT) bears some similarities to the approach
from the section 3.2, therefore we discuss here only `new' or distinctive elements.
Using C to denote consumption and G for public expenditure Keen and Lockwood (2010)
constitute a preference function U(C;G) for an economy of a single and representative con-
sumer. Public expenditure is paid for with taxes that raise revenue R. Consumer's welfare
is represented by the function U(Y   R;R), where gross income Y is a function Y (R; V )
with real number V denoting features of the tax. Marginal deadweight loss from taxation
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 YR > 0 increases with higher value of R, thus a more ecient tax instrument is one
that reduces the deadweight loss YRV > 0. From consumer's perspective a well-meaning
government would be one seeking to maximise consumer's welfare U . Governments can
do so by setting R accordingly. For any V , marginal rate of substitution for which con-
sumer would be willing to substitute privately consumed good C for public good G would
be equal to sum of 1 plus the marginal deadweight loss (equation 4.1). UGUC = 1 would
mean willingness to change one item of C for one item of public good. With increasing
deadweight loss however consumer is willing to give up less of C for G.
UG
UC
= 1  YR > 1; (4.1)
With revenue ratio dened as r  RY we reformulate 4.1 to see what happens with amount
of taxes raised when eciency of the tax system increases:
H(r; V; Y )  UC(YR   1) + UG
 UC [(1  r)Y; rY ] (YR(rY; V )  1) + UG [(1  r)Y; rY ] = 0
(4.2)
Linear approximation of 4.2 with r as a function r(V; Y ) gives r  0+1V +2Y +3V Y ,
which it turn resembles equation 3.3. Equation 3.3 serves therefore similar purpose here
as it did in `money machine' section (3.2) that is estimating revenue ratio.
Yet before a country has a fully operational VAT in place it has to implement it rst.
This does not only mean setting up legal framework but also incurring country specic
compliance, information and administrative costs, the latter denoted by K. These costs
reduce the amount available for public expenditure G and thus lead to condition 4.3, where
the maximised welfare U of a country after having adopted VAT (V = 1) and bearing costs
of it K, should be greater than U without VAT (V = 0). According to one estimate for
United States from 1980s VAT, if implemented, would have to bring $100 billion in excess
every year to make transitional expenses worth (Eccleston, 2007).
maxU
G
[Y (1; G+K) G K; G] > maxU
G
[Y (0; G) G;G] (4.3)
When expressed in terms of deadweight loss, VAT, in order to be implemented, would
have to lessen the deadweight loss to a greater extent than it costs to adapt it (K):
Y (1; G+K)  Y (0; G) > K; 8G (4.4)
Keen and Lockwood (2010) decide further to denote gain in welfare from VAT by: 4Wit =
0Zit   it with Zit as a vector of explanatory variables and it, like uit, as a normally
distributed error term. The condition on VAT, expressed by binary variable Vit is:
Vit =
8<:1; 0Zit > it0; 0Zit < it (4.5)
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Additional precaution is taken care of in case the two error terms, it and uit, were indeed
correlated. Potential selection bias would distort estimated eciency gains from VAT.
For that reason Mit, an estimate of covariance between the two error terms is calculated
(4.6) in form of a ratio of the probability density function over the cumulative distribution
function. ^ required for that ratio is obtained from Maximum Likelihood Estimation of
4.5.
Mit =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 (^
0Zit)
(^0Zit)
; Vit = 1
(^0Zit)
1  (^0Zit)
; Vit = 0
(4.6)
Mit can be then included in equation used for estimating revenue ratio (3.3) which takes
following form (4.7):
rit = Vit + 
0Xit + 0V VitXit + uMit + i + t (4.7)
Apart from variables already used in `money machine' Keen and Lockwood (2010) employ
further variables, representing decit (DEF ), share of services in as percentage of GDP
(SERV ) and also those representing regions.
Results in Table .10 included in Appendix show quite intricate stance on both reasons for
adoption and possible revenue gains from VAT. Even though Keen and Lockwood (2010)
do not try to conceal the fact that their calculations are possibly not very precise, they
were able to track certain patterns emerging from that study. On the adoption of VAT
it can be said, according to this study, it tended to spread regionally and income per
capita is not a deciding factor. Moreover, open economies are likely to gain more from
VAT than less open economies, but they are less keen on adopting it.9 This may seem
somewhat intriguing observation at rst glance. Possible explanation is, while countries
open to international trade would denitely gain from VAT, introducing it may require
much broader and comprehensive reform of the tax system. Such a reform may also be
seen as an intrinsic benet of adopting VAT, yet in developing countries depending i.e.
on taris transitional costs may be too high to justify the move to VAT. Relevant for the
adoption also seems variable for the share of agricultural sector, the higher the share of it,
the less likely a country is to implement VAT. As noted in section 3.1.1 on policy transfer,
IMF and OECD are organisations rather favourable to VAT, an impression that Keen and
Lockwood (2010) can conrm in their study - participation in non-crisis IMF programme
emerges as a variable conducive to implementation of VAT.
Table 4.1 contains predictions for long term impact of VAT on total revenues, grouped
by regions and whether countries had adopted VAT by year 2000 or not. To obtain these
values Keen and Lockwood use results from one of the regressions on revenue equation and
9Variable OPEN was measured as sum of GDP shares of imports and exports
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Asia-Pacic Americas EU+ North Africa and Small islands Sub-Saharan
Middle East Africa
countries with a VAT 2.1 0.51 4.15 0.45 4.03 -0.83
countries without a VAT 4.73 6.24 0.03 2.87 0.91
Table 4.1: Average revenue impacts of VAT (Keen and Lockwood, 2010, p. 148)
calculate short run changes (4r) in revenue.10 For countries, or regions of countries that
had not had VAT by 2000, corresponding value show mean predicted long term change in
revenue.11 For countries that had gotten VAT by 2000, values in table 4.1 show percentage
gains for the year 2000 and which have accrued since introduction of VAT. Highest gain
predicted could be expected in the Americas, around 6 per cent. Negative impact in Sub-
Saharan African countries may be due to high osetting of VAT revenues as countries
start relying less on other forms of taxation.
What this study shows, among other things, is that VAT and its eects, should not be
taken for granted as it depends on various and numerable circumstances. These are in
turn specic to every country. The decision to adapt VAT should be therefore throughly
deliberated, balancing benets and some less desirable consequences. What can we take
from this study and say in relation to the United States? Promising results, as an open
economy United States would be bound to gain more from VAT. Even though one could
not take the Canadian solution as it is and apply it over in the US (because of e.g. local
governments, that in Canada fall fully in provinces' jurisdiction, but not in US), it still is
encouraging to say the least. The idea behind the next and last section of this chapter is
to put together specic recommendation on what should the main features of VAT in the
United States, if it was to get implemented.
4.5 Recommendations on VAT for United States
The decision to implement federal consumption tax in the US would denitely not be
an easy one to get through. The diculty may be seen as twofold as it lies not only
in achieving bipartisan consensus on the necessity of introducing VAT but also on how
should it be structured. And here, partly because of how fragmented the decision making
institutions are and that the design issues of VAT are left to myriad of think tanks handing
in their own proposals, reaching a consensus may be particularly challenging. For Avi-
Yonah (2009) many of the previously suggested VATs in the US missed the point as they
were aimed at replacing income tax with consumption tax, whereas according to him,
104rit = ^Y PCV lnY PCit + ^OPENVOPENit + ^AGRVAGRit + ^FEDV FEDit
11Calculated with variables covering period 1990-2000 by 4ri;2000=(1  ),  (0.586) being coecient on
lagged dependent variable (Table .10b)
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federal VAT should be considered simply as additional tax next to taxes on income. Avi-
Yonah further lists main points that US VAT should take into account, which we briey
discuss in the remainder of this section.
First design issue touches on how the tax liability is determined, using subtraction-method
or credit-invoice method.12 Sales-subtraction VATs are typically account, entity based
while credit-invoice is transaction based relying on invoices. The relevant dierence shows
in the nature of exemptions, as the account based method tends to exempt individual
sectors of economy, transaction based rather provides exemptions for specic goods or
services and does not distort eciency of the tax as much as subtraction method does.
Next debatable feature is whether VAT should be destination or origin based. The choice
here is about how imports and exports are subject to taxation. For destination-based VATs
(which most VATs in the world are) the jurisdictional reach of the tax is the country of
consumption, for origin-based VATs it is the country where goods are produced or services
are rendered (Schenk and Oldman, 2007). Having imports zero-rated adds to consumption
eciency, having exports zero-rated on the other hand contributes to production eciency.
For United States it would seem reasonable to adapt invoice credit destination based VAT.
This variant has no compatibility issues with World Trade Organisation and oers further
great experience and knowledge base from the overwhelming majority of countries that
have adapted it, notably in the EU.
Treatment of nancial and insurance sectors is next cornerstone in how should United
States VAT be structured. Here European Union may not be considered as best-case
example as nancial services are mostly exempt from VAT, but newer VATs e.g. in New
Zealand or Australia have succeeded in taxing this branch. Avi-Yonah (2009) looks up
to Alan Schenk's proposals to tax most fee based nancial and insurance intermediation
services.13 In similar vein housing sector should be treated. With regards to taxation of it
there is considerable experience base that United States could take advantage of coming
from Canada or New Zealand that impose tax on almost all provisions of real estate
apart from reselling of used properties. The more comprehensive and wider the tax base,
the better is VAT's eciency and fewer distortions are created. This idea behind taxing
nancial and housing sectors should as well prevail in US version of VAT with regards
to the public sector. Following this time not Canadian example, where most goods and
services provided by government and public entities, charitable or non-prot organisations
are exempt and suppliers rebates (Table .9), but this of New Zealand or Australia that
grant almost no exemptions or zero-ratings for this sector.
Last, but no least remains the issue of numerous local governments, for which United
States would have to nd a working solution. Here a comprehensive study of McLure
(2009) looks into several alternatives on how to coordinate hundreds of local entities in
many states imposing their RSTs with a federal value added tax. McLure (2009) especially
12Credit invoice VAT is a credit-subtraction VAT.
13Taxation of Financial Services (Including Insurance) under a United States Value Added Tax, Tax Law
Review, 63(2), 2010
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holds combination of VAT on State level with VIVAT or CVAT, both special forms of
VAT, on local level for `feasible'. These two variants of VAT were designed to solve
diculties arising from trade between lower level jurisdictions, however with dierent
countries in mind: CVAT for India and Brazil, VIVAT for the EU (Keen, 2000). The
latter envisages a single, union/state-wide VAT rate, so that trades have to distinguish
between registered and non-registered traders. Under CVAT, additional and dedicated
administration body is required to deal with border taxes and refunds (McLure, 2009).
Traders have to dierentiate between sales within and between provinces while CVAT is
imposed on the latter and sales within the province are kept zero rated.
In this chapter we have taken a look at the subject of value added taxes in the United
States. VAT has been `mentioned', but politically never seriously considered. To what
degree this exclusion of VAT from agenda is driven by fear of political backlash one cannot
exactly say, but looking back on `Al Ullman's syndrome' and what happened to Progressive
Conservative government of Brian Mulroney in Canada one can only speculate how harsh
political consequences in the US would be. On the bright side however it seems that there
is a vast knowledge base United States could use to design its own federal version of value
added tax. It could be a remarkable opportunity to design VAT right from the scratch
capitalising on experience of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and EU.
Recalling transfer policy theory, alignment of three kinds of factors: economical, ideational
and political can together open a `window of opportunity' for signicant change of tax
code. As far as author's perception is considered, rst two categories are established facts
and slowly, but continually they are pulling the last one and the most intractable of them
all - political one, with them on board. Montgomery (2009) reports on `recent surge of
interest in VAT' and quotes a director of Tax Policy Center, Leonard Burman:
Everybody who understands our long-term budget problems understands we
are going to need a new source of revenue, and a VAT is an obvious candidate.
what may hint at exhaustive consideration of VAT in the near future.
5 Conclusion
Fiscal policy at its core operates with two instruments, taxation and governments spend-
ing. Two powerful instruments one has to add. What may be at rst seen as a constraint
- `only' two instruments, does not mean that there is little or no variety within the subject
of scal policy. As it has been discussed in chapter 2 there are many theories to what
should be the role and eciency of scal policy. From presented literature it is author's
impression that neither disregarding scal policy in favour of monetary policy nor the
inverse, complete reliance on monetary policy and casting scal policy aside, is advisable
in a long term. Rather than pointing out each other's weaknesses it is sensible to acknow-
ledge them and stride for thorough cooperation.
Taxes on consumption is recipient of the particular focus in chapter 3. For many countries
VAT, a broad base consumption tax, has found its way into their policy mix and now
would be rather considered as indispensable. The rate of adoption of VAT makes it stand
out among other forms of taxation. Yet dierent motivation hides behind each adoption
of it. For some countries it may have been simply to copy their neighbour's solution, for
others it may be a requirement (EU) and other countries saw in VAT an ecient form of
taxation. This eciency alone does not suce, as further, conducive circumstances are
needed to make change possible. Prospected eciency does come with a certain price tag
attached to it, in form of arguments frequently held against VAT - regressive impact and
`money machine' among them. For the former, International Monetary Found - an organ-
isation, that has its favouring inuence on implementation of VAT conrmed - as shown
in section 4.4, sees the expenses side of scal policy as better equipped to deal with pre-
serving progressivity. `Money machine' issue feared in Presidential Advisory Panel does
seem be traceable statistically, yet what has been shown in section 3.2 in very moderate
magnitude.
For United States VAT had been a taboo until recently, as current economic situation
paired with dim scal outlook resonated an increase of VAT proposals. This does not
mean that VAT had not been present in US politics throughout all that time. On several
occasions VAT did indeed receive some notice, but as section 4.2 describes, it has never
been granted with full consideration. Section 4.3 looked into how Canada has encountered
VAT, called GST there. It showed number of things, but most importantly it showed that
federal GST is possible in a exible framework where provinces can either have VATs as in
example of Quebec, HSTs, RSTs or like the province of Alberta - no sales taxes at all. This
means one signicant argument against VAT less. Canada has also attempted to make
GST less regressive. For Canada GST has worked as intended - helped to diminish debt
and has not become a 'money machine'. Canadian experience and this from other coun-
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tries that newly introduced VAT e.g. Australia is a valuable source of knowledge United
States can utilise to make its version even better from the start. There are some hurdles
to US VAT characteristic to the US - i.e. local governments - section 4.5 briey discusses
CVAT and VIVAT as plausible options. There is still the possibility that United States
manages its upcoming scal challenges without having to put VAT/GST in place, for that
Montgomery mentions Law Professor Michael Graetz, a VAT supporter to have said:
People are beginning to recognise that the mathematics of the currents system
are just unsustainable. You have to do something. And a VAT has got to be
on the table if you want to do something big and serious.
which may indicate slightly that the idea of introducing VAT is slowly growing and entering
public spotlight. Whether it is going to be a short-termed patch like solution giving a brief
lapse of relief (and in words of Brian Mulroney `passing the buck' to future governments
and generations) or a comprehensive reform having long-term well being of the whole
nation in mind but ruining political career of the leader trying to introduce it, time will
tell.
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Appendix
Dependent Variable: Private saving (in per cent of GDP, National Accounts denition):a
Estimated coecients
Private saving
Lagged rst dierence 0:11
(0.047)
Lagged level  0:27
(0.034)
Public saving (net lending b)
First dierence  0:51
(0.048)
Lagged Level  0:19
(0.034)
Controls
Broad money (rst dierence)  0:10
(0.271)
Change in terms of trade (rst dierence) 0:04
(0.057)
Old-age dependency ratio (lagged level)  0:28
(0.057)
Per capita GDP growth (rst dierence) 0:32
(0.027)
Housing price index (rst dierence)  0:02
(0.004)
Housing price index (lagged level)  0:02
(-0.004)
Equity market index (lagged level)  0:01
(0.001)
Memorandum items:
Implied long-term oset -0.70
No. of observations 275
No. of cross-sectional units 16
Second-order autocorrelation (p -value) 0.40
a All models are estimated using the Arellano-Bond dierence-GMM estimator and include a common
intercept (not reported). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical signicance at the 1, 5,
and 10 per cent levels is denoted by respectively (), (), and (). The null hypothesis of the Sargan
tests for overidentifying restrictions is not rejected at classical levels of signicance.
b Net lending is cyclically adjusted.
Table .1: Response of private saving to scal stance (OECD, 2004, p. 150)
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005
Australia 3,5 4,1 4,0 4,0
Austria 7,3 7,8 8,6 8,2 7,7 8,0 7,9 7,9 7,9
Belgium 3,7 6,4 7,0 7,0 6,9 6,7 7,3 6,8 7,0 7,2
Canada 2,5 3,0 3,3 3,4 3,3 3,3
Czech Republic 6,3 6,6 6,4 7,4 7,2
Denmark 2,7 7,2 6,6 9,6 9,4 8,5 9,4 9,5 9,6 9,7 10,0
Finland 5,6 6,0 5,7 6,2 7,3 8,5 7,9 8,3 8,7 8,6 8,7
France 6,9 8,6 8,2 8,4 8,3 7,8 7,3 7,3 7,0 7,2 7,3
Germany 5,5 5,2 6,2 5,9 5,9 6,5 6,8 6,4 6,2 6,2
Greece 7,1 7,0 7,9 8,3 8,3 5,9
Hungary 7,5 8,7 8,3 9,0 8,4
Iceland 8,8 9,3 10,6 9,8 10,5 11,2
Ireland 4,2 4,6 7,1 6,8 6,9 7,3 7,1 7,4 7,7
Italy 3,5 4,6 4,9 5,6 5,5 6,5 5,9 5,9 6,0
Japan 1,3 1,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,6
Korea 3,8 3,5 3,7 3,7 4,0 4,6 4,4 4,5
Luxembourg 2,5 4,0 3,7 4,4 4,2 4,5 5,2 5,4 5,9 6,1
Mexico 2,5 2,7 3,6 2,8 3,5 3,7 3,7 3,8
Netherlands 5,0 5,7 6,6 6,6 6,8 6,3 6,9 7,3 7,3 7,6
New Zealand 8,4 8,3 8,3 9,0 8,9 9,0
Norway 8,2 8,0 7,7 7,8 7,7 8,7 8,4 8,2 8,1 7,9
Poland 6,2 6,9 7,2 7,2 7,7
Portugal 5,4 7,1 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,3
Slovak Republic 7,4 7,5 7,8 7,9
Spain 5,1 5,1 6,0 5,9 6,0 6,2
Sweden 3,9 5,0 6,3 6,7 7,8 9,3 8,9 9,1 9,1 9,3
Switzerland 2,4 4,0 3,9 3,9 4,0
Turkey 3,4 3,7 5,5 7,8 8,2 7,1 7,1
United Kingdom 3,1 5,2 6,0 6,1 6,6 6,7 7,0 6,9 6,8
Unweighted average
OECD - Europe 5,1 5,6 5,6 6,5 6,7 6,7 6,8 7,4 7,4 7,5 7,6
OECD - America 2,5 2,7 3,0 2,9 3,4 2,4 3,5 3,6
OECD - Pacic 3,8 3,5 4,5 4,5 4,6 5,0 5,0 5,0
OECD - Total 5,1 5,6 5,6 6,0 6,2 6,1 6,3 6,8 6,8 6,9 6,9
Table .2: Value added taxes as percentage of GDP (OECD, 2008a)
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005
Australia 11,1 13,2 12,7 13,0
Austria 19,8 20,1 21,0 20,8 18,7 18,8 18,4 18,5 18,9
Belgium 11,1 16,3 17,0 15,8 16,5 15,3 16,2 15,4 15,6 15,9
Canada 6,9 8,4 9,3 10,2 10,0 10,0
Czech Republic 16,7 18,3 17,1 19,2 19,2
Denmark 18,8 17,3 22,3 20,2 18,3 19,3 19,3 20,0 19,9 19,9
Finland 18,5 19,0 15,6 17,3 18,3 19,3 17,4 17,4 19,4 19,6 19,8
France 20,1 25,5 23,1 20,9 19,7 18,4 17,1 16,5 16,3 16,5 16,6
Germany 17,1 14,6 16,6 15,8 16,6 17,4 18,4 17,9 17,9 18,0
Greece 24,6 22,0 21,2 21,8 21,8 21,5
Hungary 17,8 22,4 21,7 23,5 22,6
Iceland 28,4 29,9 27,6 25,9 27,2 27,0
Ireland 14,7 14,8 20,6 20,6 21,6 23,1 24,5 24,5 25,1
Italy 13,7 15,6 14,5 14,7 13,8 15,4 14,2 14,3 14,3
Japan 4,4 5,4 9,1 9,5 9,6 9,5
Korea 22,0 21,1 19,7 18,9 17,0 18,2 18,0 17,5
Luxembourg 10,6 12,1 10,5 11,1 11,8 12,2 13,3 14,3 15,8 15,8
Mexico 15,6 15,9 20,8 16,9 18,7 19,4 19,5 19,1
Netherlands 14,6 14,4 15,8 16,2 16,5 15,6 17,4 19,7 19,5 19,5
New Zealand 22,4 22,8 24,9 26,1 25,0 23,8
Norway 23,8 20,5 18,2 18,2 18,8 21,2 19,7 19,4 18,6 18,0
Poland 17,0 22,0 21,1 21,5 22,5
Portugal 19,6 22,5 23,4 23,1 23,8 23,8
Slovak Republic 22,5 22,7 24,7 25,1
Spain 15,7 15,8 17,5 17,2 17,3 17,5
Sweden 10,3 12,0 13,4 14,0 14,9 19,4 16,9 18,4 18,3 18,3
Switzerland 8,6 13,1 13,4 13,6 13,4
Turkey 22,3 18,3 24,3 24,2 24,9 22,8 21,8
United Kingdom 8,9 14,7 15,9 16,9 19,0 18,1 19,8 19,5 18,6
Unweighted averages
OECD - Europe 19,3 16,8 16,9 16,7 17,4 18,4 18,3 19,2 19,4 19,7 19,7
OECD - America 15,6 15,9 13,9 12,7 14,0 14,4 14,8 14,6
OECD - Pacic 22,0 21,1 15,5 15,7 15,5 16,8 16,3 16,0
OECD - Total 19,3 16,8 15,6 17,0 17,5 17,6 17,6 18,4 18,7 18,9 18,8
Table .3: Value added taxes as percentage of total taxation (OECD, 2008a)
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implemented standard rate reduced rate domestic specic rate applied
1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2005 2007 zero rate1 within specic region
Australia 2000 - - - - - - - - 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 - yes -
Austria 1973 18,00 18,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 10.00 / 12.00 no 16.00a
Belgium 1971 18,00 16,00 19,00 19,00 19,50 20,50 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 6.00 / 12.00 yes -
Canada 1991 - - - - 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 6,00 - yes 14.00b
Czech Republic 1993 - - - - - 23,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 19,00 19,00 5,00 yes -
Denmark 1967 15,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 - yes -
Finland 1994 - - - - - 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 8.00 / 17.00 yes -
France 1968 20,00 17,60 18,60 18,60 18,60 18,60 20,60 20,60 20,60 19,60 19,60 19,60 2.10 / 5.50 no 0.90 / 2.10 / 8.00 / 13.00 / 19.60c
1.05 / 1.75 / 2.10 / 8.50d
Germany 1968 11,00 13,00 14,00 14,00 14,00 15,00 15,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 19,00 7,00 no -
Greece 1987 - - - 16,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 19,00 4.50 / 9.00 no 3.00 / 6.00 / 13.00e
Hungary 1988 - - - 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 20,00 5,00 no -
Iceland 1989 - - - - 22,00 24,50 24,50 24,50 24,50 24,50 24,50 24,50 7,00 yes -
Ireland 1972 20,00 25,00 23,00 25,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 21,00 4.80 / 13.50 yes -
Italy 1973 12,00 15,00 18,00 19,00 19,00 19,00 19,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 4.00 / 10.00 yes -
Japan 1989 - - - - 3,00 3,00 3,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 - no -
Korea 1977 - 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 - yes -
Luxembourg 1970 10,00 10,00 12,00 12,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 3.00 / 6.00 / 12.00 no -
Mexico 1980 - 10,00 15,00 15,00 10,00 10,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 yes 10.00f
Netherlands 1969 18,00 18,00 19,00 20,00 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 19,00 19,00 19,00 6,00 no -
New Zealand 1986 - - - 10,00 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 - yes -
Norway 1970 20,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 22,00 22,00 23,00 23,00 23,00 24,00 25,00 25,00 8.00 / 14.00 yes -
Poland 1993 - - - - - 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 22,00 7,00 yes -
Portugal 1986 - - - 17,00 16,00 16,00 17,00 17,00 17,00 19,00 19,00 21,00 5.00 / 12.00 no 4.00 / 8.00 / 15.00g
Slovak Republic 1993 - - - - - 25,00 23,00 23,00 23,00 20,00 19,00 19,00 no -
Spain 1986 - - - 12,00 13,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 4.00 / 7.00 no 2.00 / 5.00 / 9.00 / 13.00h
0.50 / 4.00i
Sweden 1969 17,65 20,63 23,46 23,46 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 6.00 / 12.00 yes -
Switzerland 1995 - - - - - 6,50 6,50 6,50 7,50 7,60 7,60 7,60 2.40 / 3.60 yes -
Turkey 1985 - - - 10,00 10,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 17,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 1.00 / 8.00 no -
United Kingdom 1973 8,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 17,50 5,00 yes -
Unweighted avg. 15,64 16,45 17,79 17,15 16,55 17,56 17,79 17,93 17,76 17,82 17,71 17,71
1 Domestic zero rate means tax is applied at a rate of zero to certain domestic sales. Unlike exemption, zero rate means that no VAT is chargeable by the supplier and the supplier is able fully
recover input tax incurred in the process of making such supplies. For the purposes of this table, this category does not include zero rated exports.
a Applies in Jungholz and Mittelberg. b The provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia have harmonized their provincial sales taxes with the federal Goods
and Services Tax and levy a rate of 14%. Other Canadian provinces, with the exception of Alberta, apply a provincial tax to certain goods and services. These provincial taxes apply in addition
to GST. c Applies in Corsica. d Applies to overseas departments (DOM) excluding French Guyana. e Applies in the regions Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Dodecanese, Cyclades, Thassos,
Northern Sporades, Samothrace and Skiros. f Applies in the border regions. From 1980 to 1991 the rate applied in the border regions was 6%. g Applies in Azores and Madeira. h
Applies in the Canary Islands. i Applies in Ceuta and Melilla
Table .4: Value Added Tax / Goods and Services Tax rates in OECD member countries (OECD, 2008a)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS OLS
R-1 0.867 0.865 0.838 0.853
(41.07) (38.00) (39.94) (36.91) (37.64)
Ln(Y PC) 2.766 -8.722 -0.379 -0.998 -0.346 -0.815 -0.065
(3.97) (8.19) (1.15) (0.25) (0.56) (1.30) (0.12)
OPEN -0.338 -3.435 -0.607 -0.624 -1.241 -2.396 -0.222
(0.29) (3.50) (1.70) (1.66) (1.20) (2.10) (0.20)
AGR -0.459 -0.558 -0.099 -0.082 -0.099 -0.084 -0.032
(7.55) (3.93) (10.33) (2.01) (2.37) (2.01) (0.72)
V 3.095 1.138 0.279 0.203 0.445 -0.015 4.625
(9.28) (3.57) (1.15) (1.00) (0.23) (0.01) (2.44)
Ln(Y PC)V -0.145 -0.333 -1.368
(0.27) (0.63) (2.66)
AGRV -0.026 -0.025 -0.136
(0.54) (0.52) (2.25)
FED 0.500 0.568 0.33
(1.58) (1.70) (0.99)
OPENV 0.52 1.84 -0.196
DEPOLD 17.62 15.349
(2.94) (2.66)
DEPY OUNG -2.479 0.874
(0.71) (0.21)
IMFCR 0.002 -0.386
(0.01) (1.86)
Ln(POP ) 0.25 -0.035
(0.81) (0.11)
Observations 865 865 856 826 856 856 745
R-squared 0.91 0.94 0.98 n.a. 0.98 0.98 0.98
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies no yes no no no no no
Joint signicance n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0236 0.0708 0.0170
of VAT terms
First-order serial 0.000 0.000 0.6151 n.a. 0.634 0.4801 0.9857
correlation test
Notes:
Y PC: income per capita, AGR share of agriculture, OPEN openess-sum of GDP share of imports
and exports, DEPOLD population over 65, DEPY OUNG population betwen 14 and 65, IMFCR
participation in IMF crisis programs
1 Robust t-statistics in parentheses; and  indicates signicance at 1 percent, at 5 percent.
2 The diagnostic tests are: (i) an F-test for joint signicance of VAT terms; (ii) a test for rst
serial correlation in panels, proposed by Jerey M. Wooldridge in Econometric Analysis of Cross-
Section and Panel Data (2002). In each case, for ease of understanding, only the p-value of the
test statistic is given. Also, n.a. indicates that the test is not applicable.
Table .5: Weak `money machine' - do countries with a VAT raise more revenue?1;2 (Keen
and Lockwood, 2006, p. 914)
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1 2 3 4
Dependent variable R RV R RV
R  1 0.916 0.007 0.889 -0.004
(16.47) (0.29) (14.31) (0.14)
R  2 -0.016 0.025 -0.031 0.035
(0.30) (1.16) (0.55) (1.50)
RV   1 0.07 0.865 -0.01 0.935
(2.66) (26.12) (0.15) (21.131)
Ln(Y PC) -0.487 -0.323
(1.36) (1.99)
POP 0.007 0
(0.89) (0.15)
OPEN -0.729 -0.204
(1.91) (0.81)
AGR -0.104 -0.041
(3.92) (2.59)
Observations 971 969 848 848
R2 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.95
F-test for Granger n.a. F(2; 936) = 3:76 F(2; 810) = 2:36 F(2; 809) = 3:21
causality Prob > F= 0:0236 Prob > F= 0:0951 Prob > F= 0:0409
Notes:
1 Robsust t-statistics in parentheses; country dummies included in all regressions;
and  indicates signicance at 1 percent,  at 5 percent
Table .6: Strong `money machine' Granger-causality Tests1 (Keen and Lockwood, 2006,
p. 918)
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12 2 3 4
R  1 0.812 0.816 0.836
(0.017) (0.017) (0.181)
RV 0.598 0.172 0.172 0.137
(0.078) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041)
V -2.414 -0.835 -0.795
(0.544) (0.258) (0.258)
ln(Y PC) -5.990 -0.980 -0.817 -1.390
(1.041) (0.384) (0.0368) (0.444)
OPEN -2.726 -0.980 -0.894 -0.687
(0.951) (0.401) (0.408) (0.431)
AGR -0.432 -0.095 -0.103 -0.163
(0.057) (0.030) (0.027) (0.037)
Ln(POP ) 1.225 0.346
(0.881) (0.458)
DEPOLD 71.48 17.719 19.785 13.266
(12.619) (5.617) (4.694) (5.795)
DEPY OUNG -7.577 -3.042
(7.175) (3.736)
 0.598 0.913 0.935 0.835
(0.0708) (0.191) (0.196) (0.245)
Observations 864 825 825 630
R2 0.944
Serial correlation F(1; 29) = 1; 159:77
p=0.000
Sargan3 1.000 1.000 1.000
m1
3;4 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2
3;4 0.239 0.239 0.962
Notes:
1 Both in percent of GDP; robust z-statistics in parentheses;  indicates
signicance at 1 percent,  at 5 percent. 2 Country and time dum-
mies included (the former in all regressions) but reported, 3 p-values,
4 The m1 and m2 statistics test for rst- and second-order serial correla-
tion in the equation estimated in rst dierences, with the former present
and the latter absent if the equation is well-specied
Table .7: Strong `money machine' - relating total revenue to VAT revenue1 (Keen and
Lockwood, 2006, p. 919)
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Jurisdiction Name of tax Type of tax Rate (%) Yield2 (%) Administration Comments
Canada GST/HST VAT 5/1.3 17.3 Federal, except in
Quebec, where it is
provincial
GST rate (federal) is 5%, and applied
throughout the country;, the federal govern-
ment also administers a provincial sales tax
of 8% in the three1 HST provinces (sum is
13%)
Newfoundland
and Labrador
HST VAT 8 25.1 Federal HST revenues collected in the three HST1
provinces are distributed to provinces based
on estimated taxable consumption
Nova Scotia HST VAT 8 44.2 Federal Same as for Newfoundland
New Brunswick HST VAT 8 15.3 Federal Same as for Newfoundland
Prince Edward Is-
land
PST RST 10 27.4 Provincial Applied to retail sales price including GST
Quebec QST (TVQ) VAT 7.5 16.2 Provincial Applied to GST base plus GST
Ontario1 PST RST 8 22.3 Provincial Applied to retail sales price (excluding GST)
Manitoba PST RST 7 23.1 Provincial Same as Ontario
Saskatchewan PST RST 5 18.4 Provincial Same as Ontario
British Columbia PST RST 7 16.8 Provincial Same as Ontario
1 In March 2009 Ontario declared that from 1 July 2010 it adapts GST/HST system with 8 per cent provincial component
2 as a share of total taxes
Rates shown are for 2008. The base of the Quebec sales Tax (QST or TVQ, Taxe de vente du Quebec) diers slightly from that of GST.
Moreover, although the base of the provincial HSTs is the same as that of the GST, each province can alter the eective base by rebating its
tax. Each Retail Sales Tax (RST) province has its own tax base, generally with considerable taxation of business inputs and with limited
coverage of services, These taxes are not coordinated in any way with each other or with the federal GST.
Table .8: Sales Taxes in Canada, (Bird and Gendron, 2009, p. 3)
Appendix 54
component allocation of the HST base
consumer ex-
penditures
Consumer expenditures (excluding sales taxes) subject to HST are calculated on the basis
of purchasers price data from provincial input-output tables as updated by the more
current provincial economic accounts dataa These gures may be adjusted (as determined
by Finance in consultation with the province) to exclude expenditures that do not form
part of the tax base. These adjustments are usually very minor.
housing The housing base is calculated separately because housing is treated dierently in provin-
cial economic accounts than under the GST: for example, new construction is included
in the accounts at the time of construction rather than at the time of supply when the
GST is levied. Moreover, the value of land is excluded from the national accounts but the
GST is applied to land as well as construction.b The gross GST payable on new housing
construction, alterations, improvements and transfer costs is then grossed up by the GST
rate to estimate the housing base.
nancial sec-
tor
The nancial sector base is calculated as the unrecoverable GST { that is, GST for which
no ITC may be claimed { payable by listed nancial institutions (e.g. banks, insurance
corporations, credit unions and trust companies) allocated to a province, again grossed up
by the GST rate.c In eect, this section of the base measures the taxable expenditures of
nancial institutions related to exempt supplies.
public sector Most goods and services provided by the public sector are exempt. Since exempt suppliers
incur tax on their inputs, public sector suppliers generally receive a rebate under the rebate
system in place under the GST/HST. Initially, the rebate rate for each class of institutions
was calculated to ensure that their average tax burden would not increase as a result of the
introduction of the GST. Subsequently, the rate for municipalities was increased from the
initial 57.14% to 100% in 2004. Rebate rates now vary from 50% for charities and nonprot
organisations to 100% for municipalities. The public sector base is thus calculated on the
basis of administrative data on the rebates paid to dierent categories and then grossed
up by the product of the GST rate on purchases by each type of public sector body and
the applicable rebate rate.d
other taxable
supplies
Finally, the other (or business) component of the base is calculated in order to capture
the unrecoverable GST related to the provision of exempt supplies. As in the case of the
consumer base, this information is derived from the detailed provincial input-output tables,
adjusting for exempt supplies, exports and other factors. Since input-output tables are
only calculated every few years, this base is adjusted by a factor equivalent to the growth
in nominal provincial GDP.
a For example, in 2002 gross consumer expenditures were C$485 billion, which after deducting provincial
and federal sales taxes yields net consumer expenditures of C$455 billion. Finance Canada sends Statistics
Canada a detailed blueprint of the tax status of the 727 commodities included in the input-output accounts,
and the latter then calculates the tax base by province. For example, in the case of drugs and pharmaceut-
ical products where some items are fully taxable and some are exempt, net expenditures were C$10 billion
and the taxable proportion (nationwide) was C$3.5 billion. These taxable proportions are then applied to
the 130 categories of personal expenditure available in the provincial economic accounts.
b For these reasons, Statistics Canada uses information on house sales from the Canadian Mortgage and
Housing Corporation as well as other surveys on renovation expenditures and building permits in estimating
the gross GST paid on housing.
c The allocation of such institutions is determined by Income Tax Regulations or, if not so determined, then
by its location.
d For example, suppose that 80% of university revenues come from the sale of exempt services (e.g. tuition)
and 20% from taxable services (e.g. parking). One could calculate the university tax base from such inform-
ation; however, it is simpler to calculate that if a university receives C$10 in GST rebates, and the GST
rate is 5% and the rebate rate for universities is 67%, then the tax base is C$298.51 (C$10=67%5%).
Table .9: Allocation of HST base according to ve components, (Bird and Gendron, 2009,
p. 33)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ln(Y PC) -0.11 0.001 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.021
(0.33) (0.02) (0.64) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17)
OPEN -0.171 -0.092 -0.119 -0.092 -0.092 -0.241 -0.532
(2.53) (1.62) (1.84) (.95) (1.60) (1.62) (1.66)
AGR -0.331 -0.654 -0.816 -0.654 -0.654 -1.708 -2.01
(1.42) (2.59) (3.03) (3.20) (2.83) (2.59) (2.81)
V 1 0.963 0.951 0.953 0.951 0.951 4.649 4.574
(15.82) (13.64) (12.5) (14.03) (13.67) (13.64) (11.94)
DEPOLD 0.219 -1.804 0.219 0.219 0.573 -1.813
(0.13) (0.083) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.36)
DEPY OUNG -0.208 -0.146 -0.208 -0.208 -0.543 -1.726
(0.32) (0.29) (0.26) (0.37) (0.32) (0.85)
FED -0.109 -0.147 -0.109 -0.109 -0.28 -0.292
(1.29) (1.72) (1.32) (1.5) (1.29) (1.32)
NEIGHBOR 0.4 0.542 0.4 0.4 1.045 1.056
(3.12) (3.17) (3.77) (3.95) (3.12) (3.18)
IMFCR 0.065 0.086 0.065 0.065 0.173 0.146
(0.97) (1.26) (0.77) (0.98) (0.97) (0.83)
IMFNCR 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.697 0.714
(3.86) (3.75) (3.18) (4.08) (3.86) (3.94)
ln(POP ) 0.012 0.025 0.012 0.012 0.031
(0.78) (1.34) (0.69) (0.95) (0.78)
r 1 -1.011 -1.03 -1.011 -1.011 -2.64 -2.492
(3.30) (3.15) (2.5) (3.24) (3.30) (2.95)
AFR -0.036
(0.2)
AP -0.033
(0.17)
AS -0.126
(0.87)
NMR -0.280
(1.34)
SI 0.162
(0.91)
Observations 2913 2413 2413 2413 2413 2413 2413
Pseudo R2c 0.856 0.866 0.869 0.866 0.866 n.a. n.a.
Instrument validityd 0.61 (0.4354)
a Robust z-statistics in parentheses, b  Signicant at 5%;  Signicant at 1%,
c Pseudo R2 is unity minus the ration of the maximized log likelihood to the log likelihood when
only a constant term is included, d Distributed 2(1) undter the null, p-value in parentheses
(a) Estimates of adoption equationa;b
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ln(Y PC) -0.126 -0.088 -0.103 -0.141 -0.137 -0.141 -0.14
(4.05) (4.44) (4.93) (4..70) (4.50) (4.70) (4.57)
OPEN 0.175 0.122 0.123 0.111 0.11 0.111 0.111
(4.83) (5.16) (5.24) (4.39) (4.30) (5.03) (4.32)
AGR -1.199 -0.564 -0.592 -0.714 -0.739 -0.714 -0.712
(6.04) (4.25) (4.33) (4.97) (5.03) (4.47) (4.82)
V 0.0.34 0.017 -0.054 0.092 0.122 -0.092 -0.094
(2.70) (2.07) (1.32) (1.97) (2.35) (2.24) (2.03)
ln(r1) 0.626 0.619 0.586 0.583 0.586 0.584
(13.65) (13.24) (11.41) (11.22) (9.78) (10.73)
ln(Y PC)V 0.025 0.028 0.043 0.043 0.03
(2.08) (1.98) (2.36) (2.21) (2.21)
OPENV 0.024 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.031
(1.69) (2.05) (2.14) (1.48) (1.99)
AGRV 0.109 0.188 0.248 0.188 0.194
(0.94) (1.47) (1.88) (1.85) (1.51)
FEDV 0.011 0.02 0.014 0.02 0.017
(0.76) (1.11) (0.7) (1.01) (0.88)
DEPOLD 1.101 1.193 1.101 0.864
(2.07) (2.11) (1.82) (1.61)
DEPY OUNG -0.239 -0.26 -0.239 -0.280
(0.99) (1.07) (1.13) (1.09)
IMFCR 0.029 0.031 0.029 0.027
(2.98) (3.12) (2.88) (2.70)
IMFNCR 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035
(2.26) (2.27) (1.84) (2.15)
ln(POP ) 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06)
M 0.0003
(0.04)
Regional DummiesV No No No No Yes No No
Observations 2603 2334 2334 2117 2117 2117 2179
Sargan testc 2(1)=0.444 2(1)=0.069 2(1)=0.084 2(1)=0.081 2(1)=0.084 2(1)=0.036
(0.834) (0.793) (0.773) (0.776) (0.773) (0.851)
Serial correlation F(1,129)=121.63 F(1,129)=0.71 F(1,129)=0.54 F(1,122)=0.18 F(1,122)=0.17 F(1,122)=0.18 F(1,122)=0
test (0.000) (0.401) (0.462) (0.668) (0.680) (0.668) (0.987)
Joint signicance of F(5,2194)=3.56 F(5,2079)=2.36 F(5,2074)=2.32 F(5,25)=1.68 F(5,2040)=2.58
V and interactionsc (0.003) (0.038) (0.041) (0.176) (0.036)
a Robust z-statistics in parentheses,
b Signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%,
c For each statistic, the p-values is in brackets
(b) Estimates of revenue equationa;b
Table .10: Estimates of adoption and of revenue equation (Keen and Lockwood, 2010)
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Abstracts
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit dem Thema der Fiskalpolitik in den USA. Als
einziges Mitglied der Organisation fur wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
(OECD) haben die Vereinigten Staaten keine federale Umsatzsteuer (bzw. Mehrwertsteuer).
Wie ist es dazu gekommen, dass es gerade in den USA die weltweit popularste Steuer nicht
gibt? Ware es nicht vorteilhaft fr die USA diese Steuer somit einzufuhren? Was hat die
Einfuhrung von Mehrwertsteuer bis jetzt verhindert und welche Hurden wurden ihr im
Wege stehen - das sind die Kernfragen dieser Magisterarbeit. Um die Fragen zu beant-
worten wird zuerst Fiskalpolitik und Mehrwertsteuer erlautert - und das unter Beruck-
sichtigung von relevanten Gegebenheiten politischer Natur.
This thesis discusses the idea of introducing Value Added Tax in United States. As the
only OECD member, the US has not adopted VAT yet, a tax which since its introduction
in late 1950s/ early 1960s can be found in nearly 160 countries. Does United States
need a (federal) VAT, could it possibly benet from its introduction? These questions
gain in importance when paired with current economic stance of the US and future scal
obligation on the horizon. In order to answer these and other questions scal policy and
consumption taxes are discussed together with relevant political circumstances.
PiotrKwiatkowski Hauglin
Education
2008–2010 Master studies Business Administration, Universität Wien.
Majors: Health Care Management; Supply Chain Management
2003–2008 Bachelor’s Degree (Bakk. rer. soc. oec.), Universität Wien.
Business Administration/Betriebswirtschaft
2002 Kleines Deutsches Sprachdiplom, Goethe Insitut, Prien am Chiemsee; München.
German Language course
1998–2002 A-levels, IX Liceum Ogólnokształcące, Gdynia, Poland.
Secondary school
Master thesis
title Fiscal policy in United States and Value Added Tax
Supervisor Kunst Robert, Prof.
Experience
2008–2009 Study Assisstant, Universität Wien, Chair of Supply Chain Management.
Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics
2003 Apprentice, Aviko Farm Frites Poland S.A., Gdynia.
Export Department
Languages
native Polish
fluent English Certificate of Proficiency in English, University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations
fluent German Zentrale Oberstufe Prüfung, Kleines Deutsches Sprachdiplom, Goethe Institut
basic Norwegian
basic Russian
Computer skills
advanced standard Mac OSX, Windows, Linux
competent Oﬃce Suite, LATEX
basic SPSS, XPress, AnyLogic
Interests
photography, jogging, ethics, history, British comedy and politics
Friedrich Kaiser Gasse 1/20 – 1160 Wien – Austria
H +43 69911474781 • B piotr.kwiatkowski.hauglin@gmail.com • d.o.b.: 15.06.1983
